# Kentucky Round 2 Wiki

## 1NC

### T USfg

#### Our interpretation is that the affirmative must demonstrate the desirability of the resolution either in totality or in a particular instance to meet the necessary win condition of being topical.

#### United States federal government means the three branches of government

USA.gov 13 "USA.gov is the U.S. government's official web portal" http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/federal.shtml

U.S. Federal Government - The three branches of U.S. government—legislative, judicial, and executive—carry out governmental power and functions.

#### Increase means to make greater.

Merriam-Webster ND

“increase,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/increase

transitive verb

1: to make greater : AUGMENT

2obsolete : ENRICH

#### Interpretation: The core antitrust laws are only sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act.

The Antitrust Division 07 – Law enforcement agency that enforces the U.S. antitrust laws

“Antitrust Division Statement Regarding the Release of the Antitrust Modernization Commission Report,” The Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, April 2007, https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press\_releases/2007/222344.htm

The AMC has made many specific recommendations in its report, and the Division is in the process of reviewing all of them. The Division commends the AMC for its three primary conclusions:

Free-market competition should remain the touchstone of United States' economic policy. The Commission's conclusion in this regard is a fundamental starting point for policy makers. Over a century of experience has shown that robust competition among businesses, each striving to be increasingly successful, leads to better quality products and services, lower prices, and higher levels of innovation.

The core antitrust laws—Sherman Act sections 1 and 2 and Clayton Act section 7—and their application by the courts and federal enforcement agencies are sound and appropriately safeguard the competitiveness of the U.S. economy.

New or different rules are not needed for industries in which innovation, intellectual property, and technological innovation are central features. Unlike some other areas of the law, the core antitrust laws are general in nature and have been applied to many different industries to protect free-market competition successfully over a long period of time despite changes in the economy and the increasing pace of technological advancement. One of the great benefits of the Sherman and Clayton Acts is their adaptability to new economic conditions without sacrificing their ability to protect competition.

#### “business practices” are a repeated pattern of conduct

Lucas 88 – Judge, California Supreme Court

Malcolm Millar Lucas, Cal. ex rel. Van De Kamp v. Texaco, 46 Cal. 3d 1147, Supreme Court of California, October 1988, LexisNexis

\*\* Italics in original.

The statute defines "unfair competition" to mean, as relevant here, "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent *business practice* . . . ." ( Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200, italics added.) In so doing it effectively requires what the court variously described in the leading case of Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94 [101 Cal.Rptr. 745, 496 P.2d 817], as "a 'pattern' . . . of conduct" ( id. at p. 108), "ongoing . . . conduct" ( id. at p. 111), "a pattern of behavior" ( id. at p. 113), and, "a course of conduct" (ibid.).

#### Prohibit means Affirmative teams must completely ban a type of anticompetitive business practices – they don’t

Feldman 86 – Member of Procopio's Native American Law practice

Glenn M. Feldman, On Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 1986 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1221, Supreme Court of the United States, 1986, LexisNexis

In arguing that California's bingo laws are prohibitory rat ther than regulatory, the appeallants have simply misunderstood the fundamental distinction between "prohibition" and "regulation" of conduct. As succinctly put by the Supreme Court of Washington more than 50 years ago, after noting that the prohibition and regulation of the sale of liquor are entirely different things: "To prohibit the liquor traffic implies the putting a stop to its sale as a beverage, to end it fully, completely, and indefinitely." In contrast, regulation "implies that the sale of intoxicating liquor shall go on within the bounds of certain prescribed rules, restrictions, and limitations." Ajax v. Gregory, 32 P.2d 560, 563 (Wash. 1934). Because regulation of conduct involves prescribing limitations, regulation, by definition, necessarily involves some degree of prohibition. Blumenthal v. City of Cheyenne, 186 P.2d 556, 566 (Wyo. 1947). The two concepts, however, are analytically distinct. Therefore, when courts have been faced with statutory schemes similar to California's bingo laws, they have consistently held them to be regulatory and not prohibitory.

#### We have three impacts

#### Fairness – absent a predictable stasis, the aff can determine the scope of the debate using an infinite amount of literature bases or experiences. That makes the scope of negative research too broad and makes it too easy to be aff. Fairness outweighs any other impact because debate is a competitive activity, and a skewed debate undermines the value of the energy and research that teams put into winning the competition. It makes the debates determined by a coinflip not research.

#### Clash: it’s the only educational benefit intrinsic to debate and link turns all of their offense. Everyone comes to debate for different reasons and leaves with different skills, but the process of defending against third and fourth level responses is the only way to instantiate any of the benefits of debate and develop a deeper understanding of the content.

#### Negation – Predictable disagreement keeps participants engaged, facilitates research, and is the defining aspect of debate---they must justify why it’s valuable for us to have to rejoin their affirmative

Poscher 2020 – Ralf Poscher, Diat the Institute for Staatswissenschaft and Philosophy of Law at the University of Freiburg.

Ralf Poscher, October 13 2020, “Why We Argue About the Law: An Agonistic Account of Legal Disagreement,” Metaphilosophy of Law, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2734689

Hegel’s dialectical thinking powerfully exploits the idea of negation. It is a central feature of spirit and consciousness that they have the power to negate. The spirit “is this power only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it. This […] is the magical power that converts it into being.”102 The tarrying with the negative is part of what Hegel calls the “labour of the negative”103. In a loose reference to this Hegelian notion Gerald Postema points to yet another feature of disagreements as a necessary ingredient of the process of practical reasoning. Only if our reasoning is exposed to contrary arguments can we test its merits. We must go through the “labor of the negative” to have trust in our deliberative processes.104

This also holds where we seem to be in agreement. Agreement without exposure to disagreement can be deceptive in various ways. The first phenomenon Postema draws attention to is the group polarization effect. When a group of like‐minded people deliberates an issue, informational and reputational cascades produce more extreme views in the process of their deliberations.105 The polarization and biases that are well documented for such groups106 can be countered at least in some settings by the inclusion of dissenting voices. In these scenarios, disagreement can be a cure for dysfunctional deliberative polarization and biases.107 A second deliberative dysfunction mitigated by disagreement is superficial agreement, which can even be manipulatively used in the sense of a “presumptuous ‘We’”108. Disagreement can help to police such distortions of deliberative processes by challenging superficial agreements. Disagreements may thus signal that a deliberative process is not contaminated with dysfunctional agreements stemming from polarization or superficiality. Protecting our discourse against such contaminations is valuable even if we do not come to terms. Each of the opposing positions will profit from the catharsis it received “by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it”.

These advantages of disagreement in collective deliberations are mirrored on the individual level. Even if the probability of reaching a consensus with our opponents is very low from the beginning, as might be the case in deeply entrenched conflicts, entering into an exchange of arguments can still serve to test and improve our position. We have to do the “labor of the negative” for ourselves. Even if we cannot come up with a line of argument that coheres well with everybody else’s beliefs, attitudes and dispositions, we can still come up with a line of argument that achieves this goal for our own personal beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. To provide ourselves with the most coherent system of our own beliefs, attitudes and dispositions is – at least in important issues – an aspect of personal integrity – to borrow one of Dworkin’s favorite expressions for a less aspirational idea.

In hard cases we must – in some way – lay out the argument for ourselves to figure out what we believe to be the right answer. We might not know what we believe ourselves in questions of abortion, the death penalty, torture, and stem cell research, until we have developed a line of argument against the background of our subjective beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. In these cases it might be rational to discuss the issue with someone unlikely to share some of our more fundamental convictions or who opposes the view towards which we lean. This might even be the most helpful way of corroborating a view, because we know that our adversary is much more motivated to find a potential flaw in our argument than someone with whom we know we are in agreement. It might be more helpful to discuss a liberal position with Scalia than with Breyer if we want to make sure that we have not overlooked some counter‐argument to our case.

It would be too narrow an understanding of our practice of legal disagreement and argumentation if we restricted its purpose to persuading an adversary in the case at hand and inferred from this narrow understanding the irrationality of argumentation in hard cases, in which we know beforehand that we will not be able to persuade. Rational argumentation is a much more complex practice in a more complex social framework. Argumentation with an adversary can have purposes beyond persuading him: to test one’s own convictions, to engage our opponent in inferential commitments and to persuade third parties are only some of these; to rally our troops or express our convictions might be others. To make our peace with Kant we could say that “there must be a hope of coming to terms” with someone though not necessarily with our opponent, but maybe only a third party or even just ourselves and not necessarily only on the issue at hand, but maybe through inferential commitments in a different arena.

f) The Advantage Over Non‐Argumentative Alternatives

It goes without saying that in real world legal disagreements, all of the reasons listed above usually play in concert and will typically hold true to different degrees relative to different participants in the debate: There will be some participants for whom our hope of coming to terms might still be justified and others for whom only some of the other reasons hold and some for whom it is a mixture of all of the reasons in shifting degrees as our disagreements evolve. It is also apparent that, with the exception of the first reason, the rationality of our disagreements is of a secondary nature. The rational does not lie in the discovery of a single right answer to the topic of debate, since in hard cases there are no single right answers. Instead, our disagreements are instrumental to rationales which lie beyond the topic at hand, like the exploration of our communalities or of our inferential commitments. Since these reasons are of this secondary nature, they must stand up to alternative ways of settling irreconcilable disagreements that have other secondary reasons in their favor – like swiftness of decision making or using fewer resources. Why does our legal practice require lengthy arguments and discursive efforts even in appellate or supreme court cases of irreconcilable legal disagreements? The closure has to come by some non‐argumentative mean and courts have always relied on them. For the medieval courts of the Germanic tradition it is bequeathed that judges had to fight it out literally if they disagreed on a question of law – though the king allowed them to pick surrogate fighters.109 It is understandable that the process of civilization has led us to non‐violent non‐ argumentative means to determine the law. But what was wrong with District Judge Currin of Umatilla County in Oregon, who – in his late days – decided inconclusive traffic violations by publicly flipping a coin?110 If we are counting heads at the end of our lengthy argumentative proceedings anyway, why not decide hard cases by gut voting at the outset and spare everybody the cost of developing elaborate arguments on questions, where there is not fact of the matter to be discovered?

One reason lies in the mixed nature of our reasons in actual legal disagreements. The different second order reasons can be held apart analytically, but not in real life cases. The hope of coming to terms will often play a role at least for some time relative to some participants in the debate. A second reason is that the objectives listed above could not be achieved by a non‐argumentative procedure. Flipping a coin, throwing dice or taking a gut vote would not help us to explore our communalities or our inferential commitments nor help to scrutinize the positions in play. A third reason is the overall rational aspiration of the law that Dworkin relates to in his integrity account111. In a justificatory sense112 the law aspires to give a coherent account of itself – even if it is not the only right one – required by equal respect under conditions of normative disagreement.113 Combining legal argumentation with the non‐argumentative decision‐ making procedure of counting reasoned opinions serves the coherence aspiration of the law in at least two ways: First, the labor of the negative reduces the chances that constructions of the law that have major flaws or inconsistencies built into the arguments supporting them will prevail. Second, since every position must be a reasoned one within the given framework of the law, it must be one that somehow fits into the overall structure of the law along coherent lines. It thus protects against incoherent “checkerboard” treatments114 of hard cases. It is the combination of reasoned disagreement and the non‐rational decision‐making mechanism of counting reasoned opinions that provides for both in hard cases: a decision and one – of multiple possible – coherent constructions of the law. Pure non‐rational procedures – like flipping a coin – would only provide for the decision part. Pure argumentative procedures – which are not geared towards a decision procedure – would undercut the incentive structure of our agonistic disagreements.115 In the face of unresolvable disagreements endless debates would seem an idle enterprise. That the debates are about winning or losing helps to keep the participants engaged. That the decision depends on counting reasoned opinions guarantees that the engagement focuses on rational argumentation. No plain non‐argumentative procedure would achieve this result. If the judges were to flip a coin at the end of the trial in hard cases, there would be little incentive to engage in an exchange of arguments. It is specifically the count of reasoned opinions which provides for rational scrutiny in our legal disagreements and thus contributes to the rationales discussed above.

2. THE SEMANTICS OF AGONISTIC DISAGREEMENTS

The agonistic account does not presuppose a fact of the matter, it is not accompanied by an ontological commitment, and the question of how the fact of the matter could be known to us is not even raised. Thus the agonistic account of legal disagreement is not confronted with the metaphysical or epistemological questions that plague one‐right‐answer theories in particular. However, it must still come up with a semantics that explains in what sense we disagree about the same issue and are not just talking at cross purposes.

In a series of articles David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have reconstructed legal disagreements in semantic terms as metalinguistic negotiations on the usage of a term that at the center of a hard case like “cruel and unusual punishment” in a death‐penalty case.116 Even though the different sides in the debate define the term differently, they are not talking past each other, since they are engaged in a metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the same term. The metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the term serves as a semantic anchor for a disagreement on the substantive issues connected with the term because of its functional role in the law. The “cruel and unusual punishment”‐clause thus serves to argue about the permissibility of the death penalty. This account, however only provides a very superficial semantic commonality. But the commonality between the participants of a legal disagreement go deeper than a discussion whether the term “bank” should in future only to be used for financial institutions, which fulfills every criteria for semantic negotiations that Plunkett and Sundell propose. Unlike in mere semantic negotiations, like the on the disambiguation of the term “bank”, there is also some kind of identity of the substantive issues at stake in legal disagreements.

A promising route to capture this aspect of legal disagreements might be offered by recent semantic approaches that try to accommodate the externalist challenges of realist semantics,117 which inspire one‐right‐answer theorists like Moore or David Brink. Neo‐ descriptivist and two‐valued semantics provide for the theoretical or interpretive element of realist semantics without having to commit to the ontological positions of traditional externalism. In a sense they offer externalist semantics with no ontological strings attached.

The less controversial aspect of the externalist picture of meaning developed in neo‐ descriptivist and two‐valued semantics can be found in the deferential structure that our meaning‐providing intentions often encompass.118 In the case of natural kinds, speakers defer to the expertise of chemists when they employ natural kind terms like gold or water. If a speaker orders someone to buy $ 10,000 worth of gold as a safe investment, he might not know the exact atomic structure of the chemical element 79. In cases of doubt, though, he would insist that he meant to buy only stuff that chemical experts – or the markets for that matter – qualify as gold. The deferential element in the speaker’s intentions provides for the specific externalist element of the semantics.

In the case of the law, the meaning‐providing intentions connected to the provisions of the law can be understood to defer in a similar manner to the best overall theory or interpretation of the legal materials. Against the background of such a semantic framework the conceptual unity of a linguistic practice is not ratified by the existence of a single best answer, but by the unity of the interpretive effort that extends to legal materials and legal practices that have sufficient overlap119 – be it only in a historical perspective120. The fulcrum of disagreement that Dworkin sees in the existence of a single right answer121 does not lie in its existence, but in the communality of the effort – if only on the basis of an overlapping common ground of legal materials, accepted practices, experiences and dispositions. As two athletes are engaged in the same contest when they follow the same rules, share the same concept of winning and losing and act in the same context, but follow very different styles of e.g. wrestling, boxing, swimming etc. They are in the same contest, even if there is no single best style in which to wrestle, box or swim. Each, however, is engaged in developing the best style to win against their opponent, just as two lawyers try to develop the best argument to convince a bench of judges.122 Within such a semantic framework even people with radically opposing views about the application of an expression can still share a concept, in that they are engaged in the same process of theorizing over roughly the same legal materials and practices. Semantic frameworks along these lines allow for adamant disagreements without abandoning the idea that people are talking about the same concept. An agonistic account of legal disagreement can build on such a semantic framework, which can explain in what sense lawyers, judges and scholars engaged in agonistic disagreements are not talking past each other. They are engaged in developing the best interpretation of roughly the same legal materials, albeit against the background of diverging beliefs, attitudes and dispositions that lead them to divergent conclusions in hard cases. Despite the divergent conclusions, semantic unity is provided by the largely overlapping legal materials that form the basis for their disagreement. Such a semantic collapses only when we lack a sufficient overlap in the materials. To use an example of Michael Moore’s: If we wanted to debate whether a certain work of art was “just”, we share neither paradigms nor a tradition of applying the concept of justice to art such as to engage in an intelligible controversy.

### K

#### Political refusal finds comfort in the fulfillment of individual demands --- this accepts as a given the powerlessness of the left, depoliticizing any concrete power struggles --- radical movements must become political to combat climate change, fascism, and rampant inequality.

Dorman 16

Peter Dorman, Faculty in the Political Economy Department at Evergreen State College, “The Climate Movement Needs to Get Radical, but What Does that Mean?,” Nonsite. May 26, 2016. http://nonsite.org/editorial/the-climate-movement-needs-to-get-radical-but-what-does-that-mean

2. The cultural turn has gone too far. Of course, the deciphering of discourses has much to recommend it; all social action takes place in a context of meanings—shared, contested or both. It’s remarkable, however, that a high profile book that claims to be about radical social change, and which has won widespread approval across the leftward half of the political spectrum, could sidestep any sustained consideration of wealth and power altogether.

Why have governments failed to act to counter the threat of catastrophic climate change? Is it solely because of faulty thinking, or could it be that there exists a gross imbalance of power in every modern capitalist country, such that business interests are firmly in control? What institutions wield this power and what methods do they use? Crucially, how can those who struggle for democratic collective action contest this power? What types of organizations can be effective? What structural changes should be prioritized to rebalance power and enable rational solutions to overriding problems like climate change? I wouldn’t fault Klein for failing to provide answers—who has? What is astonishing, however, is that the questions are never posed, not even in passing. What does it mean to espouse radical politics and never take up the issue of power?

But a second absence is even more telling. At variou–s points Klein refers to the need for a price to be placed on carbon; it clearly is not her main interest, since she devotes no space at all to the political struggle required to achieve this, but she recognizes it is an important part of the story. What’s missing, however, is any serious consideration of how much money this will be, out of whose pockets it will be extracted and to whose pockets it will be transferred. I cannot emphasize how extraordinary it is for a book to be ostensibly about capitalism but pay so little attention to money.

The reality is that carbon revenues will be immense. If even approximately sufficient global action is undertaken, the sums will be in the trillions of dollars. And despite Klein’s moral calculus, the actual, real-life operation of carbon pricing will guarantee that it is the public at large—everyone who purchases a good or service with a carbon energy component—that will pay it. This is visible in gasoline taxes today, which consumers pay at the pump; a carbon price, whether it is engineered by a tax or a cap on permits, will be the same sort of tax writ very, very large. Such a tax will be regressive, and lower income people will effectively be taxed at a higher rate.

This is potentially catastrophic on multiple levels. It is intolerable from a social justice perspective in an age of rampaging inequality. It would also be impossible to disguise from voters, making it difficult to impossible to get majority support for a stiff carbon price. Klein blithely recommends using this new source of revenue to finance green investments, but she doesn’t inquire whose money is being spent, nor does she consider that, in practice, governments will simply shift a lot of the investments they would have made anyway over to this new revenue spigot, freeing up more money for their other pet projects. The one word that sums up Klein’s attitude toward this trillion-dollar question is uninterested.

Of course, there are ways to turn around the economics of carbon pricing. The money can be returned to the public on an equal per capita basis, which would have the effect of turning an otherwise regressive transfer system into a progressive, inequality-reducing one. Given the amount of money at stake, this will require a massive political mobilization, but it is worth fighting for. To repeat, however, the purpose of bringing up this issue is not to proselytize for a different system of carbon pricing, but simply to point out the glaring incongruity of an ostensibly radical, anti-capitalist book (a rather long one at that) which ignores the single most important principle for how things work in a capitalist society: follow the money!

3. The left has adapted to powerlessness. This Changes Everything practically exudes triumphalism, especially in the final hundred pages or so. Vibrant, righteous movements are springing up everywhere, we are told, and through their proliferation they will change the world.

Except, of course, they won’t. They do not have the means to change the world to something different, only to obstruct the bits of the existing world they can get their bodies in front of. That is important to do, and it can play a crucial role in a larger movement to contest power—if that movement can come into existence. If no larger movement arises, the local fires will be put out one by one. A radical political vision cannot abjure politics, and it is politics which is missing from Klein.

Here it is necessary to step back and consider the historical context. In the English-speaking world, and to a lesser extent in other wealthy, capitalist countries, the past several decades have seen profound defeat and demobilization on the left. In no country is there a mass political party with a program to transform the existing political economic order into something else. Unions, where they have any clout at all, have been fighting a rearguard struggle to retain as many of the gains of former times as they can. Of course, there have also been substantial victories for racial, gender and other social equalities and a general drift toward less authoritarian cultural norms. But the core institutions of wealth and power are more firmly entrenched now than they have been in generations, and the left as a political force is hardly noticeable.

How have those who still identify with the left coped with this epoch of powerlessness? There are many answers, but all of them express some form of disengagement. For instance, redefining politics as the performance of moral virtue rather than the contest for power can provide consolation when political avenues appear to be blocked. Activities of this sort are evaluated according to how expressive they are—how good they make us feel—rather than any objective criterion of effectiveness in achieving concrete goals or altering the balance of political forces. This is how I would interpret Blockadia, for instance, in the absence of a broader movement that includes both direct action and political contestation: Klein can devote page after page to how righteous these activists are without any attention to whether they have had or have any prospect of having an impact on carbon emissions. Their very activism constitutes its own victory, which is convenient if the more conventional sort of victory is believed to be out of reach. (It is bad form to even bring this up: why, some will ask, am I dwelling on the negative with so much positive energy to celebrate?)

Another response is to collapse social change into personal choices over lifestyle and philosophy. If you believe that the threat of climate change can be defeated by a shift to more modest consumption habits and rejection of the false intellectual gods of globalization and economic growth, one individual at a time, then each moment of conversion constitutes its own little victory. The reader of Klein’s book, feeling a sense of unity with that consciousness and its program to downshift consumption, can experience this victory first hand. This is very gratifying, and it reinforces the message that powerlessness in conventional terms is irrelevant, since the change we are part of is at a deeper level than governments and their laws or corporations and their assets. After all, what can be more subversive than thinking new thoughts?

One of Klein’s favorite adaptations is the conflation of wishes and operative political programs. Again and again she holds up statements of intent—protect Mother Earth, treat all people equally, respect all cultures, live simple, natural, local lives—as if they were proposals whose implementation would have these outcomes. It’s all ends and no means. This is a double convenience: first it eliminates the need to be factual and analytical about programs, since announcing the goal is sufficient unto itself, and second, it evades the disconcerting problem of how to deal with the daunting political challenge of getting such programs (if they even exist) enacted and enforced. I believe the treatment of goals as if they were programs is the underlying reason for the sloppiness of this book on matters of economics and law. Klein can say we should finance a large green investment program by taxing fossil fuel profits, or we should simultaneously shrink the economy and increase the number of jobs, because in the end it doesn’t matter whether these or other recommendations could actually prove functional in the real world. The truth lies in the rightness of the demand, not the means of fulfilling it. But this too is an adaptation to powerlessness.

To close, I wish to emphasize that this critique is ultimately not directed at a single individual. On the contrary, even if we consider only this one book, it is clear that its writing was a team effort; the long acknowledgments section identifies both paid assistants and an army of internal reviewers. But what I find diagnostic is the warm reception it received from virtually every media outlet on the English-speaking left. This suggests that Klein is moving with the political tide and not against it, and that the problems that seemed obvious to me were either invisible to her reviewers or regarded as too insignificant to bring up. The view that capitalism is a style of thinking, progress is a myth, and political contestation is irrelevant to “true” social change belongs not just to this one book but to all the commentators who found nothing to criticize. That’s the real problem.

#### Liberation through “logistical boundary struggles” has been commodified – it increases the dominance of capitalism – separation from the state is a watchword for fragmentation and disintegration

Vandenberghe ‘8 (Frédéric, Prof. and Researcher in the Institute of Social and Political Studies @ State University of Rio de Janeiro, “Deleuzian capitalism” *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 34.8, pp. 877-882)

The machinic phylum that animates capitalism and flows through its unified body without organs is money. Money is always in flux and never rests. It is, as Simmel says in his Philosophy of Money, the objectivation of economic circulation in a symbol without substance that represents all possible goods and that, by substituting itself for them, speeds up the circulation of goods. Flowing through the subsystems of society, invading them from underneath, vivifying them from within, money is the blood that flows through the veins of capitalism and unifies the subsystems into the single market of the integrated world system of the world economy (Braudel’s économie-monde). Marx famously likened capital to a vampire. ‘Capital is dead labour which, like a vampire, only becomes alive by sucking out living labour, and the more it sucks, the more it is lively’ (Marx, 1968: 247). Marx had obviously understood the internal connec- tion between labour and capital when he predicted its enlarged reproduction on a global scale, but fixed as he was on the category of work, he could not foresee that production would become post-industrial and that capital could exist and reproduce itself without labour (Vandenberghe, 2002). But capitalism is inventive and productive, and to capitalize, it progressively leaves the factory and invades, like a parasite, all spheres of life and the life-world itself. At the end, it ends up, as we shall see, producing and consuming life itself. The basic principle of rhizomatic sociology is that society is always en fuite, always leaking and fleeing, and may be understood in terms of the manner in which it deals with its lignes de fuite, or lines of flight. There is always something that flees and escapes the system, something that is not controllable, or at least not yet controlled. With their machinic analysis of becoming, Deleuze and Guattari want to encourage leakages and ‘cause a run off – faire fuire – as when you drill a hole in the pipe or open up the abscess’ (Guattari, 1977: 120; Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 249; Deleuze, 1990: 32). The intention is obviously anti-systemic – draining the system, digging holes, continuing the work of the old mole. **Yet**, today, the capitalistic system itself thrives on anti-systematicity, ‘artificial negativity’ (Adorno), or ‘repetition and difference’ (Deleuze). It feeds, as it were, on its own problems and in the process it changes itself and mutates. The ‘repetition of the same’ eventually leads to ‘difference’, which is tantamount to saying that the survival of capitalism means ‘continuity with difference’. Capitalism explores and anticipates the de-territorializing lines of flight to capture them from without, enter into symbiosis with them, and redirect them from within, like a parasite, towards its own ends. Capitalism is inventive; its creativity knows no limits – ‘it is of the viral type’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 580). Deleuze and Guattari put their anti-capitalist hopes in the guerrilla tactics of the schizoid minority that refuses to play the game (Marcuse’s nicht mitmachen) of the self-content majority. Although they know that the squirms of the dispersed minority accompany the war machine of the entrepreneurial companies like their ‘supplement’, although they realize that capitalism advances like a war machine that feeds on the lines of flight and indicated that capitalism knows no internal limits, they nevertheless believed that capitalism would find its logical conclusion in the schizophrenic production of a free flow of desire: ‘Schizophrenia is the external limit of capitalism itself’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972: 292). What they apparently meant by that mad statement is that the final crisis of capitalism would eventually be generated not by the regulation or domestication of capitalism but by the complete commodification of the desiring machines that we are. Only by accelerating the decadence of the present system, only through some kind of self-commodification in a consumerist potlatch, would the capitalist system be beaten by its own game: Which is the revolutionary path, if there’s one? To withdraw from the world market . . . in a curious renewal of the ‘economic solution’ of the fascists? Or might it go in the opposite direction? To go still further in the movement of the market, of decoding and territorialisation? . . . Not withdraw from the process, but going further, ‘accelerating the process’, as Nietzsche said. As a matter of fact, we ain’t seen nothing yet. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972: 285)1 A quarter of a century later, the process of accumulation has accelerated to the point that capitalism itself has become Deleuzian in form, in style and in content. This junction is not accidental. As usual, an ironic and profoundly perverse relationship exists between the romantic ethic and the spirit of capitalism (Campbell, 1987: 202–27). Needless to say that I am not claiming that Deleuze’s libertarian critique of capitalism was anti-critical or phoney from the start and that Deleuze is somehow the Giddens of the 1970s: a neo-liberal disguised as a libertarian, or Thatcher on LSD. What I am claiming is, rather, that capitalism has progressively integrated the critique of capitalism into its mode of functioning, with the result that capitalism appears stronger than ever, whereas the critique of capitalism seems rather disarmed. In their magisterial analysis of the new spirit of capitalism, Boltanski and Chiapello (1999: 241–90) have convincingly demonstrated that capitalism has coopted the postmodernizing critique of the 1960s and 1970s and used it as a way to reorganize itself and expand infinitely. The industrially organized capitalism of the ‘golden thirties’ (1945–73) was essentially Fordist. Bureaucratic, hierarchical, pyramidal and centrally controlled, planned and taylorized, oriented to the mass production of standardized goods, it was elephantine, rigid and alienating. The neo-corporatist arrangement between the state, the employers and the unions guaranteed job security, an indexed income, a steady career track and a pension, but this security hardly compensated for the employees’ lack of autonomy. Attacking the dehumanizing and disciplining, massifying and standardizing nature of the ‘capitalist-bureaucratic-technical-totalitarian society of planned exploitation and directed consumption’ (Lefebvre) in the name of spontaneity, creativity and authenticity, the libertarian left took over the ‘artistic critique’ of capitalism of the bohemians and trans- lated their grievances in a language that was inspired by surrealism and the ‘masters of suspicion’ (Marx, Freud and Nietzsche). At first, the capitalists reacted to the ‘artistic critique’ of the soixante-huitards in a traditional way. They negotiated with the unions about ‘quantitative demands’ and granted a pay-rise but, realizing that the critique did not abate in spite of the concessions, they opened discussions with the unions about the ‘qualitative demands’. To solve the motivational crisis among the ranks of the disenchanted workers, they started introducing changes in the workplace that granted more autonomy to the workers. As the increase of freedom was being paid by a decrease in security, the result was most ambivalent. ‘Through this change of politics, autonomy was somehow exchanged against security’ (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999: 274). In the wake of the crisis of accumulation of the 1970s, the capitalists proceeded to a neo-liberal reinterpretation of the libertarian critique of capitalism of the radical left. Transforming the cultural contradiction into a sociological compatibility, they progressively introduced more and more flexibility in the organization via the application of market prin- ciples. The old bureaucratic elephant of Fordism started to dance to the neo-liberal tune, but the elephants’ keepers had to hold on firmly if they did not want to lose their jobs. As the Fordist regime of ‘heavy’ accumulation was supplanted by the post-Fordist regime of ‘flexible accumulation’, the organization became not only ‘leaner’ (decentralization of management, flattening of the pyramid, flexible specialization and orientation to niche-markets, rotation of tasks, lifelong learning, outsourcing and subcontracting, etc.), it also became ‘meaner’. The principles of the market were progressively introduced in the organization, unions were sidelined, wages were individualized, contracts liberalized and labour time flexibilized, with the result that, 30 years later, the individualized, casualized and contractualized flexi-worker is confronted with insecurity and delivered to a completely restructured, radically flexibilized labour market on which she or he has to sell not only her or his labour force, but also personality, self and ultimately perhaps also soul. Together with the decline of the welfare state, the flexibilization, casualization and informalization of labour might well lead in the near future to a dualization of society and a ‘Brasilianization’ of the world (Beck, 1999: 93–110). Insecurity and vulnerability are no longer seen as a perverse effect of the dismantling of rigidities, but welcomed, valued and used to increase competition among the workers. Using old- fashioned language, we could say that insecurity is now ‘functional’. Disorganizing time as well as the career-track, flexible capitalism does not only apply the JIT (or just-in-time) approach to the punctual delivery of goods, but also to the workers and management itself. Conceived as some kind of ‘standing reserve’ that can be hired and fired at will, managers and workers alike have to become flexible, adaptable and multi-skilled, disposable and at the disposition of a new employer, available and ‘at hand’, ready for the spot market and prepared to seize any job that might improve their situation. The emphasis that is put on adaptability and availability for the market transforms the worker into a performing ‘actor-networker’ who behaves strategically and constantly looks out for opportunities to enhance his or her social capital by making connections, always more connections, on which he or she can market his or her human capital, network and personality. The good networker who treats his or her person as a marketable asset is a master in self- presentation and decorum. Promising to give himself entirely in any project, he remains in fact unattached to the job and to his self in order to remain at the disposition of any other project that might come up. Redefining her self as the opportunity may require, the actor-networker treats her personality as a mask, reverting thereby to the original meaning of the term persona as the-one-who-speaks-through-the-mask. Coincidence or not, the fact that the identity of the networker is variable and performed in and through the relations that he or she enters into chimes in all too well with the contemporary discourses on performativity, mobility, fluidity, complexity, topology, relations, networks, performances, displacements, multiple selves, etc., that follow the ‘postmodern flip’ in the human sciences.2 In the mean time, those fashionable discourses have also been introduced in the ‘cultural circuit of capitalism’ and discovered by the consultant gurus, the hero-managers and the business schools (Thrift, 1999). Transposing metaphors of the body from biology and physics to economics and psychology, the post-Darwinian message of complexity theory is relatively straightforward: corporations, groups and individuals must become flexible and fluid, transformative and innovative, agile and nimble like complex biological systems that successfully survive in nature (Martin, 1994).3 Displacing the politics of distribution by a politics of identity, those discourses have started to infiltrate and infect society at large – like a virus. With hindsight, we can now see that the hatred of the collective and transcendence, the pragmatism of connections and the disindividuation of the self that is the trademark of Deleuze and Co. is not accidental, but anticipates, expresses, accompanies and helps to perform the subject as actor-networker and to transform society into a network of transient associations. Chaos and disorder used to be enemies that had to be weeded out. With the transition from ‘heavy’ or ‘solid’ to ‘light’ or ‘liquid’ modernity (Bauman, 2000), order as such is devalued, while chaos becomes the norm and the means to rationalize and flexibilize the enterprise. Were it not for its celebratory tone, we might even have welcomed Deleuze’s and Guattari’s borderline description of schizophrenia as a more or less adequate expression of the disorganization of time, the fracturing of life-narratives and the superficiality of relations that charac- terizes the ‘corrosion of character’ of the networkers the new economy (Sennett, 1998). As it stands, I am more tempted, however, to see the ‘Deleuze-effect’ as a syndrome and symptom of a countercultural ‘bad trip’ – or ‘the sixties gone toxic’, to borrow a phrase from Jameson’s (1991: 117) justly celebrated essay on the cultural logic of late capitalism.

#### Only a strong admin state can solve climate change – otherwise extinction

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Mariana Mazzucato, “MISSION ECONOMY: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism,” Penguin Publisher, 1/28/21, https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/315/315191/mission-economy/9780241419731.html

Greening the economy demands and deserves nothing less than a moonshot worthy of the mission. It is not a question of picking a series of outcomes that are only worthwhile for some market participants and disadvantage others. Solving climate change must be transformative across the entire economy. Public, private and civil actors alike will have to shift their mindset from short-term gains to long-run outcomes and profits, particularly against the background of financial stability and transition risks that form the landscape of climate change. Industrial strategies don’t just need different goals: they need missions.

Imagine if we were to bring the courage, spirit of experimentation and willpower of the moonshot to bear on the greatest problem of our time: the climate emergency. Imagine having leaders who proudly declare: ‘We choose to fight climate change in this decade not because it is easy, but because it is hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win.’14

Around the world, there is increasing talk about the need for a Rooseveltian scale of investment to battle climate change. The notion of the Green New Deal consciously evokes the New Deal policies that began to lift the USA out of the Great Depression. A Green New Deal is about transforming production, distribution and consumption across the economy. It must be underpinned by long-term, patient finance which is willing to take risks and able to mobilize and crowd in other investors. This is key, as business investment reacts to the perception of where future opportunities lie: the climate emergency can be both a carrot and a stick to create a new direction of opportunities for the global economy. But where do we begin?

The mission map above on carbon-neutral cities (Figure 7) shows that a green transformation is not just about renewable energy. It’s also about achieving a cross-sectoral approach to innovation whose goal is to build a diverse portfolio of mission projects that engage multiple sectors and spur experimentation by as many different types of organizations. Similarly, the mission map on the future of mobility (Figure 9) spans different sectors that could alter how citizens travel, from innovations in the way that disabled people access ramps to new forms of public transport, public data practices and e-governance.

But, crucially, vision and leadership are needed. In 2019 we saw public figures on two continents take this on in two different ways. In the USA Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, a Democratic Congresswoman for New York, and Ed Markey, a Democratic Senator from Massachusetts, introduced a Green New Deal to kick-start a new type of US growth based on missions that would eliminate all US carbon emissions. In Europe, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the EU Commission, announced the launch of the European Green Deal, which advocated policy initiatives aimed at making Europe climate-neutral by 2050.15 ‘This is Europe’s man on the moon moment,’ she declared.16

The Green New Deal in the USA set a clear direction for its mission and established targeted, measurable and timebound goals. The resolution Senator Markey and Congresswoman Ocasio-Cortez introduced into Congress called for a ‘ten-year national mobilization’ towards reaching goals such as ‘meeting 100 per cent of the power demand in the United States through clean, renewable, and zero-emission energy sources’. The ultimate goal was to stop using fossil fuels entirely and to move away from nuclear energy.

Within the mission, the targets included ‘upgrading all existing buildings’ in the country for energy efficiency; working with farmers ‘to eliminate pollution and greenhouse gas emissions ... as much as is technologically feasible’ (while supporting family farms and promoting ‘universal access to healthy food’); overhauling transportation systems to reduce emissions – including expanding electric car-manufacturing, building ‘charging stations everywhere’, and expanding high-speed rail to reduce national air travel. On top of that, the mission has social goals, including a guaranteed job with a family- sustaining wage, adequate family and medical leave, paid vacations and retirement security’ and ‘high-quality health care’ for all Americans.17

#### The alternative is a radical endorsement of the administrative state – via direct engagement in political institutions we can counter political hierarchies and forces institutions to operate in the public interest

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K. Sabeel Rahman, “Book Review: Reconstructing the Administrative State in an Era of Economic and Democratic Crisis,” *Harvard Law Review*, vol. 131, 2018, pp. 1682-1689, https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/1671-1712\_Online.pdf.

A. Privatization and the Challenge of Contesting Economic and Social Structure

The regulatory state did not simply come into being because of the complexity of modern governance; rather, in its key moments of institutional innovation and development, the rise of modern administration has always been closely tied to substantive aspirations to counteract inequalities, hierarchies, and disparities of power generated by a changing social and economic order. As Michaels writes, the socioeconomic upheavals of industrialization led an "increasingly inclusive and mobilized public" to demand "greater protection from the vagaries, deceptions, and dangers of the marketplace" (p. 41). As a result, a "State newly tasked with these weighty and extensive responsibilities (and newly attuned to the disciplining effects of a more demanding, empowered, and diverse electorate) could no longer get away with being small or amateurish" (p. 41). The outcome of these demands was a burst of institutional innovation and state formation that created the explosion of new administrative bodies, commissions, and bureaucrats in the Progressive Era, accelerating with President Roosevelt's New Deal. While Michaels is certainly right to highlight the ways in which the professionalization and proceduralization of these new administrative powers were central to their legitimation, the rise of the modern regulatory state -- and its political and normative valence -- has to be understood in context of these substantive aspirations and concerns arising from the industrial economy.

The upheavals of industrialization generated more than simple economic dislocation; they provoked a deep political crisis. 26 Late nineteenth-century thinkers, lawyers, and reformers saw industrial capitalism as a fundamental threat to existing institutions and political ideals. Industrialization produced widespread immiseration, dislocation, and precarity. 27 But it also produced very clear and threatening new forms of economic power: the power of managers over workers and the rise of new corporate titans like J.P. Morgan, the Vanderbilts, and the Rockefellers, whose corporate control over finance, rail, oil, and other foundational goods and services placed whole towns and business sectors at their mercy. 28 At the same time, political institutions themselves were already viewed as captured, corrupt, or otherwise incapable of meeting these challenges: legislative corruption was a widespread concern, and a conservative judiciary posed a threat to basic state police powers aimed at protecting workers, health, and safety -- and curbing these new forms of corporate power. 29 This context generated social movements across the country, from the Farmers' Alliance (which would become the widespread Populist movement), to the largely urban, middle-class Progressive movement, to the growing organized labor movement. 30

While these movements were themselves highly diverse and heterogeneous in their members and demands, they shared a common set of ideas: that the industrial economy was a highly unequal one shaped by new forms of domination and power, and that for economic and political liberty to survive industrialization, new institutions would have to be created to empower the public and check the excesses of industrialization. First, the problem of industrial capitalism was not just one of income inequality or maldistribution. More critically, it was a problem of economic power. 31 For antitrusters and crusaders like Louis Brandeis, a key problem was that a variety of private actors, from monopolies and trusts, to finance, to corporations more broadly, had accumulated a degree of quasi-sovereign control over the economic vitality and well-being of individuals and communities -- yet were not subject to the kinds of checks and balances and norms of public justification that would have accompanied equivalent exercises of public power. 32 This problem of economic power also appeared in Progressive Era critiques of the market system itself. On this view, as thinkers like Robert Hale and John Dewey suggested, what might appear as impersonal "market forces" that, for example, drove wages down or prices up, were in fact the cumulative result of thousands of microscale transactions and bargains, each of which took place under (legally determined) disparities of power. Law constructed markets -- and thus shaped market forces themselves. 33

Second, if the problem of capitalism was really a problem of power, then the remedy required the construction of new forms of civic capacity empowered to contest such private and market power. Thus, for Progressive Era reformers, a key challenge was the challenge of action-ability. 34 As Dewey put it in his influential book, The Public and Its Problems, the problem of the modern public was that it was too scattered, diffuse, and disorganized, incapable of asserting its interests in the face of the pressures of the industrial economy. 35 By its very nature, economic inequality in an industrializing economy could not be counteracted at an individual level; the background disparities of power were systemic and could be altered only by equally systemic changes to the background rules of the marketplace itself. Indeed, this was one of the central insights of legal realist scholars and progressive economists like John Commons, Robert Hale, Richard Ely, and others, who saw the prospects for economic equity as requiring expansive efforts to restructure the background rules of the market itself. 36 By creating new institutions like regulatory bodies, reformers made it more possible to act on these seemingly powerful and diffuse forces; by situating these bodies in a larger context of public-oriented, democratic politics, these agencies could fairly be seen as agents of the public good. Thus, private power would be made contestable and governable by democracy. 37

These are the kinds of aspirations that fueled the experimentation with the expansion of the administrative state: starting at the state and local level with the efforts by cities to municipalize private utility companies and by state governments to create railroad oversight commissions and agencies to address labor, poverty, and public health, and then reaching the federal level as the Progressive Era Administrations of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson began to experiment with antitrust and economic regulatory oversight. 38 As Professor William Novak has convincingly argued, this proliferation of state and local regulatory experiments shaped a generation of legal scholars and policymakers, giving rise to the modern techniques of administrative governance and making the later New Deal creation of the modern administrative state possible. 39 The rise of administration, then, was inextricably related to the rise of democracy, in two related senses: first, the building of state regulatory capacity provided the democratic public as a whole with new tools through which to make a vision of socioeconomic order possible; second, these tools were at the outset oriented, at least in part, toward a substantive vision of democratic accountability and equality, not just of governmental actors, but perhaps even more importantly, of private economic actors whose unchecked private and market power posed a threat to democratic opportunity.

This relationship between democratic political agency and capacity, substantive ideals of democratic equality, and the administrative state also animated important episodes of regulatory institutional development and innovation in the mid- and late twentieth century. As the growing literature on "administrative constitutionalism" suggests, the frontline battles for economic, racial, and gender equality often involved the building and deploying of bureaucratic capacity, and internal battles between social movements and bureaucrats. 40 It was through the creation of regulatory institutions that labor rights, nondiscrimination protections, and access to federal welfare programs from Medicare to poverty assistance were made possible. Furthermore, it was through the pressures exerted on these bureaucracies by social movements that these regulatory tools were gradually repurposed toward enforcing and implementing equity- and inclusion-enhancing programs.

Consider, for example, Professor Karen Tani's recent work on the administration of welfare rights. As Tani documents, the development of a modern welfare rights regime involved a hard-fought shift away from a view of welfare as charitable support for the needy to welfare as a right that was an entitlement owed to members of the polity. 41 This shift had to be negotiated and was driven in large part by bureaucrats within the Social Security Administration, who asserted their specific vision of welfare as entitlement over the resistance of local welfare system administrators. To make the idea of welfare rights a reality, these bureaucrats experimented with implementing greater process protections for claimants. 42 These federal officers also developed new approaches to training and hiring bureaucrats, socializing them into a way of doing their day-to-day work that took as an axiom this more robust commitment to welfare as entitlement. 43 The success or failure of this effort turned not so much on the role of judicial interpretations of constitutional doctrine or presidential directives, but rather on more bureaucratic concerns: jurisdictional turf battles between local and state administrators more hostile to expanded welfare benefits and federal agencies seeking to expand access, difficulties of sourcing enough trained personnel who shared this larger mission, and the like. 44

A similar story can be told about the construction of equal access to Medicare. As Professor David Smith details in his historical account, it was the politics of regulation that constructed the reality of equal access to Medicare as a universal entitlement. 45 This outcome was neither obvious, nor predetermined. Rather, it was the contingent result of a complex interplay of bureaucratic innovation, social movement pressure, and regulatory policymaking. As Smith argues, in the early days of Medicare, there was a very real threat that the program would be administered in racially discriminatory and exclusionary ways. 46 The health system emerging in the mid-twentieth century reflected the legacy of racial exclusion and hierarchy in the Jim Crow South, marked by segregated and geographically concentrated hospital systems, and driving vastly divergent health outcomes and mortality rates between whites and African Americans. 47 Civil rights movement groups like the NAACP, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and Congress of Racial Equality, made the integration of hospitals and the healthcare system a key focal point -- taking the lead from African American health professionals who drove these campaigns. 48 Pressure from civil rights leaders led to a major shift in Department of Health, Education, and Welfare leadership and culture. By December 1965, the agency issued a new internal memo that declared its mission to include the compliance with an enforcement of civil rights goals, through the administering of Medicare funding for hospital systems. 49 The agency created an Office of Equal Health Opportunity in February 1966 to enforce Title VI compliance for any hospital receiving Medicare payments. 50 This new office in turn hired teams of investigators, coordinating with civil rights groups to train them and to identify hospitals that might be violating civil rights requirements. 51

The rise of the administrative state was thus not a politically neutral endeavor. The checks and balances that legitimate administrative authority in essence make possible (but do not guarantee) the contestation of deep forms of economic and social inequality, subordination, or hierarchy. This is not to say that administrative authority is always equality or inclusion promoting -- hardly. But in a reality where background economic, social, and historical conditions already encode structural disparities of wealth, opportunity, power, and influence, eliminating regulatory agencies and tools that are potentially capable of addressing these disparities (even if they are not always deployed in these ways) precludes much of equality- or inclusion-promoting public policy from getting off the ground in the first place. The dismantling of administrative institutions, then, is similarly nonneutral. Scholars of the administrative process have long warned of the dangers of special interest capture of regulatory agencies, which would cause administrative authority to be redirected to serve some interests over others. 53 But agencies can also be captured and neutered through inaction -- through what political scientists call "drift," where highly resourced and sophisticated players are able to produce substantive policy change simply by holding existing rules in place in the face of changing external conditions. 54 Dismantling agencies altogether would be an even more extreme form of opposition to these potential uses: rather than trying to capture or simply neuter the agency, more radical efforts to deconstruct regulatory institutions cut off the very possibility by eliminating the regulatory capacity itself, a kind of complete and total capture through deconstruction.

This substantive valence of administrative power and its potential deconstruction adds an important layer to Michaels's critique of privatization. Michaels alludes to the ways in which privatization risks permanently dismantling institutional tools and capacities that are difficult to rebuild. As Michaels warns, under privatization, "we will have hollowed out the government sector to such an extent that we may well lack the capacity, infrastructure, and know-how to reclaim that which has increasingly been outsourced or marketized" (p. 12). He rightly notes that privatization emerged as a "pivot[]" strategy in the Reagan era, a "second-best" to dismantling regulatory bodies themselves (p. 97). This is a problem in particular because "the Market, at least in its pure, idealized state, is not democratic, deliberative, or juridical. . . . It is the world of Schumpeter and Coase, not Montesquieu or Madison" (p. 5). Private corporate governance, meanwhile, cannot replicate the kinds of checks and balances that the separation of powers principles require (p. 164).

Dismantling administration and returning to private ordering is therefore troubling for democracy in three senses. First, given prior background structural patterns of exclusion and disparities of wealth, power, and opportunity, a return to private economic and social ordering is by definition a return to economic inequality, social hierarchy, and exclusion. Second, the dynamics of market competition or of corporate governance cannot replicate or replace public institutions of democracy or of checks and balances. They operate fundamentally differently and are not substitutes. Third, a dismantling of regulatory institutions removes some of the most vital and effective mechanisms through which we as a democratic public seek to contest and reshape these background structural inequities and exclusions: without tools of general administrative policymaking and enforcement, these structural inequities are harder to overcome and reshape.

### Case

#### Consequentialism is the only coherent framework for evaluation –you can’t determine if the alt is ethical without assessing the implications of adopting that approach to the world

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(Jeffrey, Ends, Means and Politics, Dissent, Vol 49, Iss. 2, Spring)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Extinction is a categorically distinct phenomenon that outweighs other considerations

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(Anthony, Stefanie Fishel is Assistant Professor, Department of Gender and Race Studies at the University of Alabama, Audra Mitchell is CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Simon Dalby is CIGI Chair in the Political Economy of Climate Change at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and, Daniel J. Levine is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Alabama, “Planet Politics: Manifesto from the End of IR,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 1–25)

8. Global ethics must respond to mass extinction. In late 2014, the Worldwide Fund for Nature reported a startling statistic: according to their global study, 52% of species had gone extinct between 1970 and 2010.60 This is not news: for three decades, conservation biologists have been warning of a ‘sixth mass extinction’, which, by definition, could eliminate more than three quarters of currently existing life forms in just a few centuries.61 In other words, it could threaten the practical possibility of the survival of earthly life. Mass extinction is not simply extinction (or death) writ large: it is a qualitatively different phenomena that demands its own ethical categories. It cannot be grasped by aggregating species extinctions, let alone the deaths of individual organisms. Not only does it erase diverse, irreplaceable life forms, their unique histories and open-ended possibilities, but it threatens the ontological conditions of Earthly life.

IR is one of few disciplines that is explicitly devoted to the pursuit of survival, yet it has almost nothing to say in the face of a possible mass extinction event.62 It utterly lacks the conceptual and ethical frameworks necessary to foster diverse, meaningful responses to this phenomenon. As mentioned above, Cold-War era concepts such as ‘nuclear winter’ and ‘omnicide’ gesture towards harms massive in their scale and moral horror. However, they are asymptotic: they imagine nightmares of a severely denuded planet, yet they do not contemplate the comprehensive negation that a mass extinction event entails. In contemporary IR discourses, where it appears at all, extinction is treated as a problem of scientific management and biopolitical control aimed at securing existing human lifestyles.63 Once again, this approach fails to recognise the reality of extinction, which is a matter of being and nonbeing, not one of life and death processes.

Confronting the enormity of a possible mass extinction event requires a total overhaul of human perceptions of what is at stake in the disruption of the conditions of Earthly life. The question of what is ‘lost’ in extinction has, since the inception of the concept of ‘conservation’, been addressed in terms of financial cost and economic liabilities.64 Beyond reducing life to forms to capital, currencies and financial instruments, the dominant neoliberal political economy of conservation imposes a homogenising, Western secular worldview on a planetary phenomenon. Yet the enormity, complexity, and scale of mass extinction is so huge that humans need to draw on every possible resource in order to find ways of responding. This means that they need to mobilise multiple worldviews and lifeways – including those emerging from indigenous and marginalised cosmologies. Above all, it is crucial and urgent to realise that extinction is a matter of global ethics. It is not simply an issue of management or security, or even of particular visions of the good life. Instead, it is about staking a claim as to the goodness of life itself. If it does not fit within the existing parameters of global ethics, then it is these boundaries that need to change.

9. An Earth-worldly politics. Humans are worldly – that is, we are fundamentally worldforming and embedded in multiple worlds that traverse the Earth. However, the Earth is not ‘our’ world, as the grand theories of IR, and some accounts of the Anthropocene have it – an object and possession to be appropriated, circumnavigated, instrumentalised and englobed.65 Rather, it is a complex of worlds that we share, co-constitute, create, destroy and inhabit with countless other life forms and beings.

The formation of the Anthropocene reflects a particular type of worlding, one in which the Earth is treated as raw material for the creation of a world tailored to human needs. Heidegger famously framed ‘earth’ and ‘world’ as two countervailing, conflicting forces that constrain and shape one another. We contend that existing political, economic and social conditions have pushed human worlding so far to one extreme that it has become almost entirely detached from the conditions of the Earth. Planet Politics calls, instead, for a mode of worlding that is responsive to, and grounded in, the Earth. One of these ways of being Earth-worldly is to embrace the condition of being entangled. We can interpret this term in the way that Heidegger66 did, as the condition of being mired in everyday human concerns, worries, and anxiety, to prolong existence. But, in contrast, we can and should reframe it as authors like Karen Barad67 and Donna Haraway68 have done. To them and many others, ‘entanglement’ is a radical, indeed fundamental condition of being-with, or, as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it, ‘being singular plural’.69 This means that no being is truly autonomous or separate, whether at the scale of international politics or of quantum physics. World itself is singular plural: what humans tend to refer to as ‘the’ world is actually a multiplicity of worlds at various scales that intersect, overlap, conflict, emerge as they surge across the Earth. World emerges from the poetics of existence, the collision of energy and matter, the tumult of agencies, the fusion and diffusion of bonds.

Worlds erupt from, and consist in, the intersection of diverse forms of being – material and intangible, organic and inorganic, ‘living’ and ‘nonliving’. Because of the tumultuousness of the Earth with which they are entangled, ‘worlds’ are not static, rigid or permanent. They are permeable and fluid. They can be created, modified – and, of course, destroyed. Concepts of violence, harm and (in)security that focus only on humans ignore at their peril the destruction and severance of worlds,70 which undermines the conditions of plurality that enables life on Earth to thrive.

#### The aff’s focus on localized politics can’t solve—the void will be filled by reactionary right wing, turning the aff

**Pugh 10** (Jonathan, Newcastle Postcolonial Geographer,“The Stakes of Radical Politics have Changed: Post-crisis, Relevance and the State”, Globalizations, March-June, ebsco)

In this polemical piece I have just been talking about how, following an ethos of radicalism as withdrawal from the state, **some from the radical Left were incapable of being able to respond to the new stakes of radical politics.** **In particular, they were not found at the state, where the passive public turned to resolve the** **crisis. I will now go on to examine how in recent years significant parts of the radical Left have also tended to prioritise raising awareness of our ethical responsibilities, over capturing state power**. I am going to say that it is important to create this awareness. However, in an effort to draw attention to the stakes of politics as we find them now, post-2008, I will also point out that we should not place too much faith in this approach alone. Against the backdrop of what I have just been saying, it is important to remember that while much attention is focused upon President Obama, in many other parts of the world the Right and fundamentalism are gaining strength through capturing state power. The perception that the USA has changed is accompanied by a sense of relief among many radicals. **However, the European Elections of 2009, the largest trans-national vote in history, heralded a continent-wide shift to the Right (and far Right) in many places—in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portgual, Slovenia, Spain, Romania, as just some examples** (Wall Street Journal, 2009). Despite Obama’s election and a near depression, neo-liberalism continues to be implemented through a world spanning apparatus of governmental and intergovernmental organisations, think tanks and trans-national corporations (Massey, 2009; Castree, 2009). The power of the Right in countries like Iran, while checked, remains unchallenged by the Left. **Albertazzi et al. (2009) draw attention to how a disconnected Left is leaving power in the hands of the Right in many other countries nationally, like Italy for example**. Reflecting upon contemporary radical politics, the British Labour politician Clare Short (2009, p. 67) concludes: In the fog of the future, I see a rise of fascistic movements . . . I am afraid it will all get nastier before we see a rise in generous, radical politics, but I suspect that history is about to speed up in front of our eyes and all who oppose the radicalisation of fear, ethnic hatred, racialism and division have to be ready to create a new movement that contains the solutions to the monumental historical problems we currently face. So, the stakes of politics are clear. The Right is on the rise. Neo-liberal ideology is still dominant. How is the Left responding to these stakes? I have already discussed how some from the radical Left are placing too much faith in civil society organisations that seek to withdraw from the state. I will now turn to how others have too much faith in the power of raising awareness of our ethical responsibilities. **Post-crisis, the increasing popularity of David Chandler’s (2004, 2007, 2009a, 2009b) work reflects the sense that radicals too often celebrate the ethical individual as a radical force, at the expense of wider representational programmes for change**. **His central argument is that this leaves radicals impotent**. Chandler (2009a, p. 78–79) says that many radicals argue that there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political activist protests, such as the 2003 anti-war march, anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation protests, the huge march to Make Poverty History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of Al-Qaeda. I disagree; **these new forms of protest are highly individualised and personal ones**— **there is no attempt to build a social or collective movement**. **It appears that theatrical suicide, demonstrating, badge and bracelet wearing are ethical acts in themselves: personal statements of awareness, rather than attempts to engage politically with society.** In one way, Chandler’s reflective insight here is not particularly unique. Many others also seem to think that radicals today are too isolated and disengaged (Martin, 2009).5 Neither is it particularly original to say that there is too much emphasis upon creativity and spontaneity (what Richard Sennett, 2004, calls ‘social jazz’), and not enough upon representational politics. Indeed, go to many radical blogs and you find radicals themselves constantly complaining about how it has become too easy to sign up to ethical web petitions, email complaints, join a variety of ethical causes, without actually developing the political programmes themselves that matter. So it is not Chandler’s point about radicals being disengaged from instrumental politics that concerns me here. It is his related point—that there has been a flight into ethics, away from political accountability and responsibility that I find intriguing. Personal statements of ethical awareness have become particularly important within radical politics today. It is therefore interesting to note, as I will now discuss, that we have been here before. In his earlier writings Karl Marx (1982) criticised the German Idealists for retreating into ethics, instead of seizing the institutions of power that mattered for themselves. **Unwilling to express their self-interests politically through capturing power, the Idealists would rather make statements about their ethical awareness. Such idealism, along with an unwillingness to be held accountable for political power, often goes hand in hand.** For Marx, it is necessary to feel the weight, but also the responsibility of power. Chandler argues that, just as when the early Marx critiqued German Idealism, we should now be drawing attention to the pitfalls of the flights to ethics today. He says: In the case of the German bourgeoisie, Marx concludes that it is their weakness and fragmentation, squeezed between the remnants of the ancien re´gime and the developing industrial proletariat, which explains their ideological flight into values. Rather than take on political responsibility for overthrowing the old order, the German bourgeoisie denied their specific interests and idealised progress in the otherworldly terms of abstract philosophy, recoiling from the consequences of their liberal aspirations in practice. (Chandler, 2007, p. 717) Today we are witnessing a renewed interest in ethics (Laı¨di, 1998; Badiou, 2002). **Fragmented, many radicals retreat into abstract ethical slogans like ‘another world is possible’, ‘global human rights’, or ‘making poverty history’.** As discussed above, we are also of course seeing the return of Kant’s cosmopolitanism. While I think we should not attack the ethical turn for its values, as many of these around environmental issues and human rights are admirable**, it is equally important to say that the turn to ethics seems to reflect a certain lack of willingness to seize power and be held accountable to it.** For the flight to ethics, as it often plays out in radical politics today, seems to be accompanied by scepticism toward representational politics. Continuing with this theme for a moment, Slavoj **Zizek** (2008) also sheds some more light upon why ethics (when compared to representational politics) has become so important to the Left in recent years. He **says that many of us** (he is of course writing for the Left) **feel that we are unable to make a real difference** through representational politics on a larger scale, when it comes to the big political problems of life. Zizek (2008, p. 453) talks of this feeling that ‘we cannot ever predict the consequences of our acts’; that nothing we do will ‘guarantee that the overall outcome of our interactions will be satisfactory’. And he is right to make this point. Today, our geographical imaginations are dominated by a broader sense of chaos and Global Complexity (Urry, 2003; Stengers, 2005). These ways of thinking, deep in the psyche of many radicals on the Left may be one other reason why so many have retreated into ethics. When we do not really believe that we can change the world through developing fine detailed instruments, capturing the state, or predictive models, we are naturally more hesitant. It is better to try and raise ethical awareness instead. Whereas in the past power was something to be won and treasured, something radicals could use to implement a collective ideology, today, with the risk posed by representation in fragmented societies, top-down power often becomes a hazard, even an embarrassment, for many on the Left (Laı¨di, 1998). This is, as I have already discussed, where the Right and neo-liberal ideologues are seizing the opportunity of the moment. **Putting what I have just said another way, there is a need to be clear, perhaps more so in these interdisciplinary times—ethics and politics (particularly representational politics) are different**. Of course they are related. You cannot do politics without an ethical perspective. **But my point here is that the Right and neo-liberal ideologues will not simply go away if the Left adopt or raise awareness of alternative ethical lifestyles. The Right are willing to capture state power, particularly at this time when the state is increasingl**y powerful. When we compare the concerted political programme of neo-liberalism, first developed by Reagan, Thatcher, the IMF, the World Bank, NATO, multi-national banks, and the G20, as just some of many examples, ethical individuals across the world offer some counter-resistance. **But the 2008 crisis, and the response of protests like the Alternative G20, demonstrated how weak ethical resistance is in the face of the institutions of the neo-liberal economy.** **Another reason for this is because the ethical individual contributes so much to neo-liberal societies themselves.** To explain how, we must briefly step back. The new social movements of previous decades have, in general, been effectively recuperated by the existing system of capital, by satisfying them in a way that neutralised their subversive potential. This is how capital has maintained its hegemonic position in post-Fordist societies. Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2005) explain how capitalists have worked with, rather than against, the characteristics of new social movements. **They say the new social movements desire for autonomy, the ideal of self-management, the anti-hierarchical exigency, and the search for authenticity, were important in developing post-Fordism**. These replaced the hierarchical framework of the Fordist period with new forms of networked control. And so, in this way, we see that the relationship between new social movements and capital has been productive. In turn, and this is the important point I want to make about the present moment, clearly the stakes of radical politics have now changed once more. As discussed earlier, it would now seem that post-Fordist society is actually more hierarchical and controllable than many previously thought. **Without the neoliberal state, and the public’s subordination to its actions, it would not now exist in anything like its present form. Our subordination to the state has stopped a post-crisis implosion of neo-liberalism. And this is of course where one of the central characteristics of the ethical individual has been so productive. Endemic individualism, so dominant in liberal societies, has been recuperated by the ethical individual who is unwilling to seize the state. So the salient point here is that the ethical individual is reflective of the conservative forces in society today.**

#### Disruptive action won’t solve and is counterproductive – people capitulate when arrested and it leads to increased state repression

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(Bron, “Resistance: Do the Ends Justify the Means?” Chapter 28 of State of the World 2013: Is Sustainability Still Possible)

Modern societies are unduly celebratory of their achievements when they have amnesia about what has been lost and by whom. With an understanding of the tragic aspects of this history and recognition that these very processes are ongoing, it is clear that dramatic actions to halt these processes and engage in restorative justice and healing where possible are morally obligatory.

This does not mean, however, that the revolutionary prescription of the Deep Green Resistance activists — attacking the energetic infrastructure of industrial civilization — is warranted. Indeed, the claim that this could cause the collapse of industrial civilization is fanciful. Natural disasters (including those intensified or worsened by human activities) demonstrate that as long as energy is available, large-scale societies will rebuild. Even if resisters were to disrupt the system significantly, not only would the system’s rulers rebuild, recent history has shown that they would increase their power to suppress resisting sectors.

Moreover, as many radical activists have acknowledged in interviews — even those who have supported sabotage — the more an action risks or intends to hurt people, the more the media and public focus on the tactics rather than the concerns that gave rise to the actions. This means that the most radical tactics tend to be counterproductive to the goal of increasing awareness and concern in the general public.

When accessing the effectiveness of resistance, it is also important to address how effective authorities will be at preventing and repressing it. The record so far does not lead easily to enthusiasm for the most radical of the tactics deployed thus far. Authorities use tactics that are violent or can be framed as such to justify to the public at large spying, infiltration, disruption, and even violence against these movements. Such repression typically succeeds in eviscerating the resistance, in part because as people are arrested and tried, some will cooperate with the prosecution in return for a reduced sentence.

More than half of those arrested did just that during what Federal authorities dubbed “operation backfire,” which led to the arrests and conviction of more than two dozen Earth Liberation Front saboteurs who had been involved in arson cases. One of the leaders, facing life in prison under post-9/11 terrorism laws, committed suicide shortly after his arrest, while several others became fugitives. The individuals convicted drew prison terms ranging from 6 to 22 years. The noncooperating activists, and those for whom terrorism enhancements had been added to the arson charges, drew the longest terms.

As if this were not devastating enough to the resistance, broader radical environmental campaigns that were not using such radical tactics ebbed dramatically in the wake of these arrests. This was because movement activists who were friends and allies of those arrested rallied to provide prison support, which then took their time and resources away from their campaigns. But it was also because the resistance community was divided over whether (and if so, how) to support the defendants who, to various degrees, cooperated with investigators. Given this history, it makes little sense to base strategy and tactics on such an unlikely possibility that communities of resistance will ever be able to mount a sustained campaign to bring down industrial civilization, even if that were a desirable objective.

The envisioned alternative to this objective — creating or, in the view of many activists, returning to small-scale, egalitarian, environmentally friendly lifestyles — would not be able to support the billions of people currently living on Earth, at least not at anything remotely like the levels of materialism that most people aspire to. So the most radical of the resistance prescriptions would quite naturally lead to strong and even violent counter-resistance.13

These ideologies, explicitly or implicitly, make unduly optimistic assumptions about our species, including about our capacity to maintain solidarity in the face of governmental suppression, as well as about the human capacity for cooperation and mutual aid. To expect such behavior to become the norm may be conceivable, and it may be exemplified by some small-scale societies, but it is not something to be expected universally, let alone during times of social stress intensified by increasing environmental scarcity.

So despite the accurate assessment about the ways agricultural and industrial societies have reduced biocultural diversity, there is little reason to think that the most radical resistance tactics would be able to precipitate or hasten the collapse of such societies. Nor is there much evidence that such tactics would contribute to more-pragmatic efforts to transform modern societies. In contrast, there is significant evidence that these sorts of tactics have been and are likely to remain counterproductive.

#### The aff assumes a transformative potential from small moments of resistance that simply does not exist.

Reed 16 (Adolph, Jr., Prof. of Political Science @ Penn., “Splendors and Miseries of the Antiracist “Left”” *Nonsite*, http://nonsite.org/editorial/splendors-and-miseries-of-the-antiracist-left-2)

More than a decade and a half ago I criticized similar formulations of a notion of “infrapolitics,” understood as the domain of pre-political acts of everyday “resistance” undertaken by subordinated populations, which was then all the rage in cultural studies programs. Proponents of the political importance of this domain insisted that, because insurgent movements emerge within such cultures of quotidian resistance, a) examining them could help in understanding the processes through which insurgencies develop and/or b) they therefore ought to be considered as expressions of an insurgent politics themselves. Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political economy of academic life, including the self-propulsion of academic trendiness and the atrophy of the left outside the academy, which encouraged flights into fantasy for the sake of optimism. The infrapolitics idea also resonated with the substantive but generally unadmitted group essentialism underlying claims that esoteric, insider knowledge is necessary to decipher the “hidden transcripts” of the subordinate populations; put more bluntly, elevating infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its interpreters’ academic capital.8

I discussed those factors in my critique. However, the point in that argument most pertinent for evaluating Birch and Heideman’s confidence that the contradictions they acknowledge in BLM should be seen only as growing pains of a “new movement” is the following:

At best, those who romanticize “everyday resistance” or “cultural politics” read the evolution of political movements teleologically; they presume that those conditions necessarily, or even typically, lead to political action. They don’t. Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Think about it: infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political movements are rare.9

#### Capitalism is key to massive improvements in living standards, poverty, and environmental sustainability – any other system shuts that down and worsens environmental and social problems

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Mark Budolfson, “Arguments for Well-Regulated Capitalism, and Implications for Global Ethics, Food, Environment, Climate Change, and Beyond,” *Ethics and International Affairs*, vol. 35, no. 1, 2021, pp. 86-88, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/96F422D04E171EECDEF77312266AE9DD/S0892679421000083a.pdf/arguments-for-well-regulated-capitalism-and-implications-for-global-ethics-food-environment-climate-change-and-beyond.pdf.

Premise 1. Development and the past. Over the course of recorded human history, the majority of historical increases in health, wellbeing, and justice have occurred in the last two centuries, largely as a result of societies adopting or moving toward capitalism. Capitalism is a relevant cause of these improvements, in the sense that they could not have happened to such a degree if it were not for capitalism and would not have happened to the same degree under any alternative noncapitalist approach to structuring society. The argument in support of this premise relies on observed relationships across societies and centuries between indicators of degree of capitalism, wealth, investments in public goods, and outcomes for health, wellbeing, and justice, together with econometric analysis in support of the conclusion that the best explanation of these correlations and the underlying mechanism is that large increases in health, wellbeing, and justice are largely driven by increasing investments in public goods. The scale of increased wealth necessary to maximize these investments requires capitalism. Thus, as capitalist societies have become dramatically wealthier over the past hundred years (and wealthier than societies with alternative systems), this has allowed larger investments in public goods, which simply has not been possible in a sustained way in societies without the greater wealth that capitalism makes possible. Important investments in public goods include investments in basic medical knowledge, in health and nutrition programs, and in the institutional capacity and know-how to regulate society and capitalism itself. As a result, capitalism is a primary driver of positive outcomes in health and wellbeing (such as increased life expectancy, lowered child and maternal mortality, adequate calories per day, minimized infectious disease rates, a lower percentage and number of people in poverty, and more reported happiness);5 and in justice (such as reduced deaths from war and homicide; higher rankings in human rights indices; the reduced prevalence of racist, sexist, homophobic opinions in surveys; and higher literacy rates).6 These quantifiable positive consequences of global capitalism dramatically outweigh the negative consequences (such as deaths from pollution in the course of development), with the result that the net benefits from capitalism in terms of health, wellbeing, and justice have been greater than they would have been under any known noncapitalist approach to structuring society.7

Premise 2. Economics, ethics, and policy. Although capitalism has often been ill-regulated and therefore failed to maximize net benefits for health, wellbeing, and justice, it can become well-regulated so that it maximizes these societal goals, by including mechanisms identified by economists and other policy experts that do the following:

• optimally8 regulate negative effects such as pollution and monopoly power, and invest in public goods such as education, basic healthcare, and fundamental research including biomedical knowledge (more generally, policies that correct the failures of free markets that economists have long recognized will arise from “externalities” in the absence of regulation);9

• ensure equity and distributive justice (for example, via wealth redistribution);10

• ensure basic rights, justice, and the rule of law independent of the market (for example, by an independent judiciary, bill of rights, property rights, and redistribution and other legislation to correct historical injustices due to colonialism, racism, and correct current and historical distortions that have prevented markets from being fair);11 and

• ensure that there is no alternative way of structuring society that is more efficient or better promotes the equity, justice, and fairness goals outlined above (by allowing free exchange given the regulations mentioned).12

To summarize the implication of the first two premises, well-regulated capitalism is essential to best achieving our ethical goals—which is true even though capitalism has certainly not always been well regulated historically. Society can still do much better and remove the large deficits in terms of health, wellbeing, and justice that exist under the current inferior and imperfect versions of capitalism.

Premise 3. Development and the future. If the global spread of capitalism is allowed to continue, desperate poverty can be essentially eliminated in our lifetimes. Furthermore, this can be accomplished faster and in a more just way via well-regulated global capitalism than by any alternatives. If we instead opt for less capitalism, less growth, and less globalization, then desperate poverty will continue to exist for a significant portion of the world’s population into the further future, and the world will be a worse and less equitable place than it would have been with more capitalism. For example, in a world with less capitalism, there would be more overpopulation, food insecurity, air pollution, ill health, injustice, and other problems. In part, this is because of the factors identified by premise 1, which connect a turn away from capitalism with a turn away from continuing improvements in health, wellbeing, and justice, especially for the developing world. In addition, fertility declines are also a consequence of increased wealth, and the size of the population is a primary determinant of food demand and other environmental stressors.13 Finally, as discussed at length in the next section of the essay, capitalism can be naturally combined with optimal environmental regulations.14 Even bracketing anything like optimal regulation, it remains true that sufficiently wealthy nations reduce environmental degradation as they become wealthier, whereas developing nations that are nearing peak degradation will remain stuck at the worst levels of degradation if we stall growth, rather than allowing them to transition to less and less degradation in the future via capitalism and economic growth.15 In contrast, well-regulated capitalism is a key part of the best way of coping with these problems, as well as a key part of dealing with climate change, global food production, and other specific challenges, as argued at length in the next section. Here it is important to stress that we should favor wellregulated capitalism that includes correct investments in public goods over other capitalist systems such as the neoliberalism of the recent past that promoted inadequately regulated capitalism with inadequate concern for externalities, equity, and background distortions and injustices.16

#### Competition in the private sector is key to drive down costs in space exploration – spurs innovation

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Harvard Business Review, 2-12-2021, "The Commercial Space Age Is Here," <https://hbr.org/2021/02/the-commercial-space-age-is-here>

There’s no shortage of hype surrounding the commercial space industry. But while tech leaders promise us moon bases and settlements on Mars, the space economy has thus far remained distinctly local — at least in a cosmic sense. Last year, however, we crossed an important threshold: For the first time in human history, humans accessed space via a vehicle built and owned not by any government, but by a private corporation with its sights set on affordable space settlement. It was the first significant step towards building an economy both in space and for space. The implications — for business, policy, and society at large — are hard to overstate.

In 2019, [95%](https://brycetech.com/reports) of the estimated $366 billion in revenue earned in the space sector was from the space-for-earth economy: that is, goods or services produced in space for use on earth. The space-for-earth economy includes telecommunications and internet infrastructure, earth observation capabilities, national security satellites, and more. This economy is booming, and though [research shows](https://hbsp.harvard.edu/product/716037-PDF-ENG) that it faces the challenges of overcrowding and monopolization that tend to arise whenever companies compete for a scarce natural resource, [projections for its future](https://hbsp.harvard.edu/product/720027-PDF-ENG) are optimistic. Decreasing costs for launch and space hardware in general have enticed new entrants into this market, and companies in a variety of industries have already begun leveraging satellite technology and access to space to drive innovation and efficiency in their earthbound products and services.

In contrast, the space-for-space economy — that is, goods and services produced in space for use in space, such as mining the Moon or asteroids for material with which to construct in-space habitats or supply refueling depots — has struggled to get off the ground. As far back as the 1970s, [research](https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19780004167) commissioned by NASA predicted the rise of a space-based economy that would supply the demands of hundreds, thousands, even millions of humans living in space, dwarfing the space-for-earth economy (and, eventually, the entire terrestrial economy as well). The realization of such a vision would change how all of us do business, live our lives, and govern our societies — but to date, we’ve never even had more than [13 people](https://www.space.com/6503-population-space-historic-high-13.html) in space at one time, leaving that dream as little more than science fiction.

Today, however, there is reason to think that we may finally be reaching the first stages of a true space-for-space economy. SpaceX’s [recent achievements](https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-s-spacex-crew-1-astronauts-headed-to-international-space-station/) (in cooperation with NASA), as well as upcoming efforts by [Boeing](https://www.nasa.gov/feature/boeing-s-starliner-makes-progress-ahead-of-flight-test-with-astronauts), [Blue Origin](https://www.blueorigin.com/news/nasa-selects-blue-origin-national-team-to-return-humans-to-the-moon), and [Virgin Galactic](https://spacenews.com/virgin-galactic-prepares-to-transition-to-operations) to put people in space sustainably and at scale, mark the opening of a new chapter of spaceflight led by private firms. These firms have both the intention and capability to bring private citizens to space as passengers, tourists, and — eventually — settlers, opening the door for businesses to start meeting the demand those people create over the next several decades with an array of space-for-space goods and services.

Welcome to the (Commercial) Space Age

In our [recent research](https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/jep.32.2.173_Space,%20the%20Final%20Economic%20Frontier_413bf24d-42e6-4cea-8cc5-a0d2f6fc6a70.pdf), we examined how the model of centralized, government-directed human space activity born in the 1960s has, over the last two decades, made way for a new model, in which public initiatives in space increasingly share the stage with private priorities. Centralized, government-led space programs will inevitably focus on space-for-earth activities that are in the public interest, such as national security, basic science, and national pride. This is only natural, as expenditures for these programs must be justified by demonstrating benefits for citizens — and the citizens these governments represent are (nearly) all on earth.

In contrast to governments, the private sector is eager to put people in space to pursue their own personal interests, not the state’s — and then supply the demand they create. This is the vision driving SpaceX, which in its first twenty years has entirely upended the rocket launch industry, securing 60% of the global commercial launch market and building ever-larger spacecraft designed to ferry passengers not just to the International Space Station (ISS), but also to its own promised [settlement on Mars](https://www.spacex.com/media/making_life_multiplanetary_transcript_2017.pdf).

Today, the space-for-space market is limited to supplying the people who are already in space: that is, the handful of astronauts employed by NASA and other government programs. While SpaceX has grand visions of supporting large numbers of private space travelers, their current space-for-space activities have all been in response to demand from government customers (i.e., NASA). But as decreasing launch costs enable companies like SpaceX to leverage economies of scale and put more people into space, growing private sector demand (that is, tourists and settlers, rather than government employees) could turn these proof-of-concept initiatives into a sustainable, large-scale industry.

This model — of selling to NASA with the hopes of eventually creating and expanding into a larger private market — is exemplified by SpaceX, but the company is by no means the only player taking this approach. For instance, while SpaceX is focused on space-for-space transportation, another key component of this burgeoning industry will be manufacturing.

[Made In Space, Inc.](https://madeinspace.us/capabilities-and-technology/archinaut/) has been at the forefront of manufacturing “in space, for space” since 2014, when it 3D-printed a wrench onboard the ISS. Today, the company is exploring other products, such as high-quality fiber-optic cable, that terrestrial customers may be willing to pay to have manufactured in zero-gravity. But the company also recently received a [$74 million contract](https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-funds-demo-of-3d-printed-spacecraft-parts-made-assembled-in-orbit) to 3D-print large metal beams in space for use on NASA spacecraft, and future private sector spacecraft will certainly have similar manufacturing needs which Made In Space hopes to be well-positioned to fulfill. Just as SpaceX has begun by supplying NASA but hopes to eventually serve a much larger, private-sector market, Made In Space’s current work with NASA could be the first step along a path towards supporting a variety of private-sector manufacturing applications for which the costs of manufacturing on earth and transporting into space would be prohibitive.

Another major area of space-for-space investment is in building and operating space infrastructure such as habitats, laboratories, and factories. Axiom Space, a current leader in this field, recently [announced](https://www.theverge.com/2021/1/26/22250327/space-tourists-axiom-private-crew-iss-price) that it would be flying the “first fully private commercial mission to space” in 2022 onboard SpaceX’s Crew Dragon Capsule. Axiom was also [awarded](https://spacenews.com/nasa-selects-axiom-space-to-build-commercial-space-station-module/) a contract for exclusive access to a module of the ISS, facilitating its plans to develop modules for commercial activity on the station (and eventually, beyond it).

This infrastructure is likely to spur investment in a wide array of complementary services to supply the demand of the people living and working within it. For example, in February 2020, Maxar Technologies was awarded a [$142 million contract](https://www.builtincolorado.com/2020/02/03/maxar-technologies-142m-nasa-contract) from NASA to develop a robotic construction tool that would be assembled in space for use on low-Earth orbit spacecraft. Private sector spacecraft or settlements will no doubt have need for a variety of similar construction and repair tools.

#### A slew of black swans make extinction inevitable. Moral hedging necessitates space habituation

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Marko Kovic, “Why space colonization is so important,” Medium. November 10, 2018. <https://medium.com/@marko_kovic/space-colonization-why-nothing-else-matters-a877723f77d4>

Space or bust: Why we must reach for the stars

Why should we pursue space colonization in the first place? Don’t we have more pressing problems today, on Earth?

Yes, we do have many problems on Earth today, and we should try to solve them. But space colonization is just that: A strategy for dealing with certain problems. An the problems that space colonization would be dealing with are, arguably, among the greatest problems of them all: Existential risks; risks that might lead to the extinction of humankind [1]. Currently, all of our proverbial existential eggs are in the same basket. If a natural existential risk strikes (for example, a large asteroid colliding with Earth) or if a man-made existential risk results in a catastrophic outcome (for example, runaway global warming [2, 3]), all of humankind is at risk because humankind is currently limited to planet Earth. If, however, there are self-sustainable human habitats beyond Earth, then the probability of an irreversibly catastrophic outcome for all of humankind is drastically reduced.

Investing in space colonization today could therefore have immense future benefits. Using resources today in order to make space colonization possible in the medium-term future is not a waste, but a very profitable investment. If humankind stays limited to Earth and if we go extinct as a consequence of doing so, then we will all the billions of life years and billions of humans who might have come to exist — and who would have experienced happiness and contributed to humankind’s continued epistemic and moral progress.

#### Profit motive and market competition are key to curbing emissions – any alternative can’t scale up in time or it gets overwhelmed by popular backlash

Turner 19 – Baron Turner of Ecchinswell, Senior Fellow at the Institute for New Economic Thinking, chaired the UK Financial Services Authority

Adair Turner, “Is Capitalism Incompatible with Effective Climate Change Action?,” World Economic Forum, September 3, 2019, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/is-capitalism-incompatible-with-effective-climate-change-action/>.

Believers in a market economy are dismayed by radical voices arguing that capitalism is incompatible with effective climate action. But unless capitalism's defenders start supporting more ambitious targets and policies to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by mid-century, they should not be surprised if an increasing number of people agree.

This year, the evidence that global warming is occurring, and that the consequences for humanity could be severe and potentially catastrophic, has become more compelling than ever. Record global temperatures in June and July. Unprecedented heatwaves in Australia and India, with temperatures above 50°C. Huge forest fires across northern Russia. All of these things tell us that we are running out of time to cut greenhouse-gas emissions and contain global warming to at least manageable levels.

The response has been growing demand for radical action. In the United States, proponents of the Green New Deal argue that America should be a zero-carbon economy by 2030. In the United Kingdom, activists of the “Extinction Rebellion” movement demand the same by 2025, and have severely disrupted London transport through very effective forms of civil disobedience. And the argument that avoiding catastrophic climate change requires rejecting capitalism is gaining ground.

Against this growing tide of radicalism, companies, business groups, and other establishment institutions urge caution and more measured action. Achieving zero emissions as early as 2030, they argue, would be immensely costly and require changes in living standards which most people will not accept. Illegal actions that disrupt others’ lives, it is said, will undermine popular support for necessary measures. A more affordable and gradual path of emissions reduction would be better and still prevent catastrophe, and market instruments operating within the capitalist system could be powerful levers of change.

These counterarguments are robust. The costs of achieving a zero-carbon economy will increase dramatically if we try to get there in ten years, not 30. Most forms of capital equipment naturally need replacement within 30 years, so switching to new technologies over that timeframe would cost relatively little, whereas switching over ten years would require companies to write off large quantities of existing assets.

Technological progress – whether in solar photovoltaic panels, batteries, biofuels, or aircraft design – will make it much cheaper to cut emissions in 15 years than today. And the profit motive is spurring venture capitalists to make huge investments in the new technologies required to deliver a zero-carbon economy.

Meanwhile, decentralized market mechanisms such as carbon pricing are essential to drive change in key industrial sectors, given the multiplicity of possible routes to decarbonization. Socialist planning will not be as effective: Venezuela is an environmental as well as a social disaster. And there is a real danger that excessively rapid action could alienate popular support. After all, the gilets jaunes (yellow vest) movement in France was provoked by tax increases designed to make diesel cars uneconomic, but were imposed at a time when electric vehicles are not yet cheap enough and lack the range to be a viable alternative for less well-off people living outside major cities.

But it is also true that the capitalist system has failed to respond to the challenge of climate change fast enough; and in some ways, capitalism has impeded effective action. Venture capitalists financing brilliant technological breakthroughs have been matched by industry lobby groups successfully arguing against required regulations or carbon taxes. If adequate policies had been adopted 30 years ago, we would be well on the way to achieving a zero-carbon economy at a very low cost. The fact that we did not is, in part, capitalism’s fault.

Massively accelerated action is now required. All developed economies should commit to achieving net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. And zero must mean zero, with no pretense that we can continue burning large quantities of fossil fuels in the late twenty-first century, balanced by equally large quantities of carbon capture and storage.

Developing economies should get there by 2060 at the very latest. That would still leave us vulnerable to significant and unavoidable climate change, but climate science suggests that it would be sufficient to avoid catastrophe. And as the Energy Transitions Commission described in its recent Mission Possible report, it is still possible to achieve that objective at relatively low economic cost,

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provided we adopt without delay the policies required to drive rapid change.

Carbon taxes should be introduced at a sufficiently high level, and with future increases declared well in advance, to drive the multi-decade investment plans required to decarbonize heavy industry. Carbon tariffs should be used to protect industry from being undercut by imports from countries that fail to apply adequate carbon prices. Airlines should face either steadily rising carbon prices, or regulations requiring them to use a rising proportion of zero-carbon fuels from clearly sustainable sources, with the percentage reaching 100% before 2050.

Blunt but effective instruments – such as banning new sales of internal combustion engine autos from a specific future date, such as 2030, should also be part of the policy armory. And regulations should ban putting plastics in landfills and plastic incineration, forcing the development of a complete plastics recycling system.

None of these policies is anti-capitalist. Instead they are the policies we need to unleash capitalism’s power to solve the problem. Once clear prices and regulations are in place, market competition and the profit motive will drive innovation, and economies of scale and learning-curve effects will force down the costs of zero-carbon technologies. And if we do not unleash that power, we will almost certainly fail to contain climate change.

Believers in a market economy are dismayed by radical voices arguing that capitalism is incompatible with effective climate action. But unless capitalism’s defenders support the immediate establishment of far more ambitious targets and policies to achieve net-zero emissions by mid-century, they should not be surprised if an increasing number of people believe that capitalism is the problem and not part of the solution. They will be right to do so.

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#### Their romanticization of those local resistance guarantee that fossil fuel lobbyists can continue to destroy our planet with no recourse – only engaging in a radical engagement in state based politics can solve

Parenti and Emanuele 15 (Christian Parenti, former visiting fellow at CUNY's Center for Place, Culture and Politics, as well as a Soros Senior Justice Fellow, teaches in the Liberal Studies program at New York University, interview with Vincent Emanuele, writer, activist and radio journalist who lives and works in the Rust Belt, “Climate Change, Militarism, Neoliberalism and the State,” May 17, 2015, http://ouleft.sp-mesolite.tilted.net/?p=1980)

You mention mutual aid and how it was overhyped by the left in the aftermath of Katrina. I’m thinking of the same thing in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. You’ve been critical of the left in the US for not approaching and using the state apparatus when dealing with climate change and other ecological issues. Can you talk about your critique of the US left and why you think the state can, and should, be used in a positive manner? Just to be clear, I think it is absolutely heroic and noble what activists have done. My critique is not of peoples’ actions, or of people; it’s of a lack of sophistication, and I hold myself partly accountable, as part of the US left, for our deficiencies. With Hurricane Sandy, the Occupy folks did some amazing stuff. Yet, at a certain level, their actions became charity. People were talking about how many meals they distributed. That’s charity. That is, in many ways, a neoliberal solution. That’s exactly what the capitalist system in the US would like: US citizens not demanding their government redistribute wealth from the 1% to the 99%. The capitalists love to see people turn to each other for money and aid. Unwittingly, that’s what the anarcho-liberal left fell into. This is partly due a very American style of anti-state rhetoric that transcends left and right. The state is not just prisons or the military. It’s also Head Start, quality public education, the library, clean water, the EPA, the City University of New York system – a superb, affordable set of schools that turns out top-notch, working-class students with the lowest debt burdens in the country. There’s a reason the right is attacking these institutions. Why does the right hate the EPA and public education? Because they don’t want to pay to educate the working class, and they don’t want the working class educated. They don’t want to pay to clean up industry, and that’s what the EPA forces them to do. When the left embraces anarcho-liberal notions of self-help and fantasies of being outside of both government and the market, it cuts itself off from important democratic resources. The state should be seen as an arena of class struggle. When the left turns its back on the social democratic features of government, stops making demands of the state, and fails to reshape government by using the government for progressive ends, it risks playing into the hands of the right. The central message of the American right is that government is bad and must be limited. This message is used to justify austerity. However, in most cases, neoliberal austerity does not actually involve a reduction of government. Typically, restructuring in the name of austerity is really just a transformation of government, not a reduction of it. Over the last 35 years, the state has been profoundly transformed, but it has not been reduced. The size of the government in the economy has not gone down. The state has become less redistributive, more punitive. Instead of a robust program of government-subsidized and public housing, we have the prison system. Instead of well-funded public hospitals, we have profiteering private hospitals funded by enormous amounts of public money. Instead of large numbers of well-paid public workers, we have large budgets for private firms that now subcontract tasks formerly conducted by the government. We need to defend the progressive work of government, which, for me, means immediately defending public education. To be clear, I do not mean merely vote or ask nicely, I mean movements should attack government and government officials, target them with protests, make their lives impossible until they comply. This was done very well with the FCC. And my hat goes off to the activists who saved the internet for us. The left should be thinking about the ways in which it can leverage government. The utility of government was very apparent in Vermont during the aftermath of Hurricane Irene. The rains from that storm destroyed or damaged over a hundred bridges, many miles of road and rail, and swept away houses. Thirteen towns were totally stranded. There was a lot of incredible mutual aid; people just started clearing debris and helping each other out. But within all this, town government was a crucial connective tissue. Due to the tradition of New England town meeting, people are quite involved with their local government. Anarchists should love town meetings. It is no coincidence that Murray Bookchin spent much of his life in Vermont. Town meetings are a form of participatory budgeting without the lefty rigmarole. More importantly, the state government managed to get a huge amount of support from the federal government. The state in turn pushed this down to the town level. Without that federal aid, Vermont would still be in ruins. Vermont is not a big enough political entity to shake down General Electric, a huge employer in Vermont. The Vermont government can’t pressure GE to pay for the rebuilding of local infrastructure, but the federal government can. Vermont would still be a disaster if it didn’t get a transfer of funds and materials from the federal government. Similarly in New York City, the public sector does not get enough praise for the many things it did well after super storm Sandy. Huge parts of the subway system were flooded, yet it was all up and running within the month. As an aside, one of the dirty little secrets about the Vermont economy is that it’s heavily tied-up with the military industrial complex. People think Vermont is all about farming and boutique food processing. Vermont has a pretty diverse economy, but agriculture plays a much smaller role than you might think, about 2 percent of employment. Meanwhile, the state’s industrial sector, along with the government, is one of the top employers, at about 13 percent of all employment. Most of this work is in what’s called precision manufacturing, making stuff like: high performance nozzles, switches, calibrators, and stuff like the lenses used in satellites, or handcrafting the blades that go in GE jet engines. But I digress … As we enter the crisis of climate change, it’s important to be aware of the actually existing legal and institutional mechanisms with which we can contain and control capital. I often joke with my anarchist and libertarian friends and ask if their mutual-aid collectives can run Chicago’s sanitation system or operate satellites. Of course, on one level, I’m joking, but on another level, I’m being quite serious. I don’t think activists on the left properly understand the complexity of modern society. A simple example would be how much sewage is produced in a single day in a country with 330 million people. How do people expect to manage these day-to-day issues? In your opinion, is there a lack of sophistication on the left in terms of what, exactly, the state does and how it functions in our day-to-day lives? It’s sobering to reflect on just how complex the physical systems of modern society are. And though it is very unpopular to say among most American activists, it is important to think about the hierarchies and bureaucracies that are necessarily part of technologically complex systems. A friend of mine is a water engineer in Detroit, and he was talking to me about exactly what you’re mentioning. The sewer system in Detroit is mind-bogglingly enormous and also very dilapidated and very expensive. To not have infrastructure publicly maintained, even though the capitalist class might not admit this, would ultimately undermine capital accumulation. You asked if there is a lack of sophistication. Look, I’m trying to make helpful criticisms to my comrades on the left, particularly to activists who work so hard and valiantly. I’ve criticized divestment as a strategy, yet I support it. I criticized the false claims that divesting fossil fuels stocks would hurt fossil fuel companies. The fossil fuel divestment movement started out making that claim. To its credit, the movement has stopped making such claims. Now, they say that it will remove the industries "social license," which is a problematic concept that comes from the odious world of "corporate social responsibility." However, now, students are becoming politicized, and that’s always great news. For several years, some of us have been trying to get climate activists, the climate left, to take the EPA and the Clean Air Act seriously. The EPA has the power to actually de-carbonize the economy. The divestment logic is: Schools will divest, then fossil fuel companies will be held in greater contempt than they are now? Honestly, they’re already hated by everybody. That does what? That creates the political pressure to stop polluting? We already have those regulations: the Clean Air Act. There was a Supreme Court Case, Massachusetts v. EPA, that was ruled on in 2007. It said the EPA must regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Lots of professional activists in the climate movement, at least up until very recently, have been totally unaware of this. Consequently, they are not making demands of the EPA. They are not making demands of their various local, state and federal environmental agencies. These entities should be enforcing the laws. They have the power. It’s not because the people in the climate movement are bad people or unintelligent. They’re dedicated and extremely smart. It’s because there’s an anti-state ethos within the environmental movement and a romanticization of the local. On a side note, I don’t think all of this stuff about local economies is helpful. Sometimes I think this sort of thinking doesn’t recognize how the global political economy works. The comrades at Jacobin magazine have called this anarcho-liberalism. I think that is a great way to describe the dominant ideology of US left, which is both anarchist and liberal in its sensibilities. This ideology is fundamentally about ignoring government, and instead, being obsessed with scale, size, and, by extension, authenticity. Big things are bad. Small things are good. Planning is bad. Spontaneity is good. It is as insidious as it is ridiculous. But it is the dominant worldview among the US left. Do you really think that this is the best way to approach the industry, through mobilizing state resources? Look, the fossil fuel industry is the most powerful force the world has ever seen. Be honest, what institution could possibly ~~stand up to~~ [rebuff] them? The state. That doesn’t mean it will. Right now, government is captured by these corporate entities. But, it has, at least in theory, an obligation to the people. And it also has the laws that we need to wipe out the fossil fuel industrial complex. This sounds fantastical and nuts, but I don’t think it is. I’ve been harping on this in articles and a little bit at the end of Tropic of Chaos. According to the Center for Biological Diversity, Nixon-era laws can be used to sue developers, polluters, etc. You might not be able to stop them, but you can slow them down. The Clean Air Act basically says that if science can show that smoke-stack pollution is harmful to human health, it has to be regulated. If there was a movement really pushing the government, and making the argument that the only safe level of CO2 emissions is essentially zero … We have the laws in place. We have the enabling legislation to shut down the fossil fuel industry. We should use the government to levy astronomical fines on the fossil fuel companies for pollution. And we should impose them at such a level that it would undermine their ability to remain competitive and profitable. Part Two: Vincent Emanuele: Much of the green washing, or capitalism’s attempt to brand itself as green, focuses on localism and anti-government, market-driven programs. Do you think this phobia of the state among the US left is a result of previous failed political experiments? How much of this ideology is imposed from outside forces? Christian Parenti: Some state phobia comes from the American political mythology of rugged individualism; some comes from the fundamentally Southern, Jeffersonian tradition of states’ rights. Fear of the federal government by Southern elites goes back to the founding of the country. The Hamiltonian versus Jeffersonian positions on government are fundamental to understanding American politics. I wrote about this for Jacobin magazine in a piece called "Reading Hamilton from the Left." Lurking just beneath the surface of states’ rights is, of course, plantation rights. Those plantations, places like Monticello, were America’s equivalent of feudal manors where, in a de facto sense, economic, legal and military power were all bound up together and located in the private household of the planter. Those Virginian planters were the original localistas. Nor did that project end with the fall of slavery, or the end of de jure segregation in the 1960s. Southern elites didn’t want Yankees telling them what to do; how to treat their slaves, how to organize their towns, how to run their elections, how to treat the environment – none of that! The South is a resource colony and its regional elites, some of them now running multinational corporations and holding important posts in the US government, believe they have a right to do what they wish with the people and landscape. Historically, that’s a large part of what localism and local democracy meant in the South. It meant that White local elites were "free" – free to push Black people around, free to feed racist fantasies to the White working class. They didn’t want interference from the outside. So, some of that anti-statist ideology comes from that plantation tradition. Another part of it comes from the real failures and crimes of state socialism, though state socialism also had, and in Cuba still has, many successes. The social welfare record of what we used to call "actually existing socialism" was pretty impressive. But there were also the problems of repression, surveillance and bureaucratization, which were partly the result of capitalist encirclement, partly the result of the ideological hubris rooted in ideological overconfidence in the allegedly scientific power of Marxism, partly the result of simple corruption among socialism’s political class. These real problems were central themes in the Cold War West’s educational and ideological apparatus of (generally right-wing) messaging from the press and the political class. In this discourse, communism was the state, while freedom was the private sector. Thus, the United States and freedom became embodied in popular notions of the private sector and individualism. Of course, the great, unmentioned contradiction in this self-fantasy is the fact that American capitalism has always been heavily, heavily dependent on the state. Modern society, despite its fantasies about itself, is intensely cooperative and collective. Look at how complex its physical systems are; that cannot be achieved without massive levels of coordination and collective cooperation, much of it provided by the rules and regulations of government. The knee-jerk anti-statism, what the folks at Jacobin call "anarcho-liberalism," is also rooted in experience. The less social power you have, the more the state is experienced as an invasive, demeaning, oppressive and potentially, very violent bureaucracy. Neoliberalism would not have gotten this far if there wasn’t an element of truth to this critique of its bureaucracy and regulation. It has also used ideas that have old cultural tractions, like freedom. Such are the contradictions of the modern democratic state in capitalist society. Government is rational, supportive, humane, [and offers] redistribution in the form of Social Security, high-quality public schools, environmental regulation, the Voting Rights Act and other federal civil rights laws that have helped break hegemonic power of local and regional bigots. But government is also militarized policing, the bloated prison system, spying on a vast scale; it is child protective services taking children from loving mothers on the basis of bureaucratic traps, corrupt corporate welfare at every level from town government to federal military contracting. The racist, sexist, plutocratic and techno-bureaucratic features of the state create fertile ground for people to turn their backs on the whole idea of government. What has been the impact of the right’s ability to effectively propagandize the White working class in the US? Rightist intellectuals, academics, journalists, media tycoons, university presidents and loudmouth politicians work diligently to capture and form the raw experience of everyday oppression into an ideological common sense. To be clear, I use that term in the Gramscian sense, in which common sense refers to ruling class ideology that is so hegemonic as to be absorbed and naturalized by the people. The constant libertarian assault on the radio, in newspapers, on the television, this drumbeat of anti-government discourse is an old story – but still very important for understanding the anarcho-liberal sensibility. Just tune in to AM radio late on a weekday evening and listen to the anti-government vitriol. It’s sort of wild. Someone could do an interesting study, Ph.D., in unpacking the cultural history of all this. It is tempting to speculate that deindustrialization, having disempowered and made anxious many huge sections of the working class, opens the way for fantasies of empowerment. The anti-statist, rugged individualist common sense is also always simultaneously a fantasy of empowerment. White men are particularly vulnerable to these fantasies. The classic guy who calls into the batshit crazy, late night, right-wing talk radio show is a middle-aged White man. Listen closely to the rage and you hear fantasies of independence. In this rhetoric, guns and gun rights become an obviously phallic symbol of individual empowerment, agency, self worth, responsibility etc. But most importantly, we have to think about how all of this anti-state ideology is being stirred up with investments from elites. The neoliberal project is to transform the state through anti-statist rhetoric and narratives. They sell the idea that people need to be liberated from the state. But then push policies that imprison people while liberating and pampering capital. It is hard for the left to see itself in this sketch – the angry, beaten-down, middle-aged White guy calling in from his basement or garage. But I think these much-documented corporate efforts to build neoliberal consent permeate the entire culture and infect us all, if even just a little bit. This is the intellectually toxic environment in which young activists are approaching the question of the climate emergency. Young activists should be approaching the climate crisis the way the left approached the economic crisis during the Great Depression. We need to drastically restructure the state. We need it mobilized and able to transform the economy. The New Deal was imperfect, of course. It left domestic workers and farm workers out of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It was inherently racist. It dammed rivers and was environmentally destructive. However, the New Deal was radical in its general empowerment of labor; its distributional outcomes were progressive and it achieved a modernizing transformation of American capitalism. Not to overstate the case, but the New Deal could be a reference point for thinking about the beginning of a green transformation that seeks to euthanize the fossil fuel industry. We have to precipitously reduce greenhouse gas emissions and build a new power sector. That much is very clear. However, let me be clear: Shutting down the fossil fuel industry – mitigating the climate crisis – is not a solution for the environmental crisis. Climate change is only one part of the multifaceted environmental crisis. Shutting down the fossil fuel industry would not automatically end overfishing, deforestation, soil erosion, habitat loss, toxification of the environment etc. But carbon mitigation is the most immediately pressing issue we face. The science is very clear on this. Climate change is the portion of the overall crisis that must be solved immediately so as to buy time to deal with all the other aspects of the crisis. Because I take the political implications of climate science very seriously, I am something of a carbon fundamentalist.

#### Their emphasis on the disruptive nature of localized struggle legitimize the use of violence that leads to broader state brutality

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(Gregory and Michael J., “Introduction,” in *Radical Intellectuals and the Subversion of Progressive Politics*, pg. 1-32)

A third salient feature of this nouveau radicalism is its emphasis on spontaneous, **disruptive, and localized struggle** as the means of politics. Taking their cues from the legacy of anarchism and third-world indigenous struggles such as the Zapatistas, these tactics are seen as the **essence of a democratic politics of resistance**. The basis for new movements is now seen to be the emergence of new identities, themselves created from the exaggerated subjectivity of the modern, narcissistic self.14 Rejecting the state and conceiving of a post-state politics is now a central dogma of the new “radical” theorists. Since the state is seen to be inherently despotic, only the spontaneous, autonomous collection of groups who act against the state and outside of it are viewed as vehicles of political change. The absence of domination is now cast as the freedom to explore narcissistic **lifestyles** as well as expand an **already exaggerated subjectivity** where participatory and direct democracy become the political ideal. In the end, they valorize the individual’s resistance to the state and the power of localism. Here left and right touch in their extremes—it is precisely a libertarian ethos of freedom **that dominates their vision**, as David Harvey has insightfully pointed out: “This is the world that libertarian Republicans construct. It is also the view of individual liberty and freedom embraced by much of the anarchist and autonomist left, even as the capitalist version of the free market is roundly condemned.”15 Now, **it is a “**multitude,” a disruptive demos, that commands the political imaginary of the new radicals. Instead of a rational radical position that seeks to democratize the state and its powers and to transform it in order to enhance and protect public goods, the new interpretation of radical democracy “is only intelligible once it is thought as being against the state—and once the term ‘democratic State,’ which appeared so naturally from Tocqueville’s pen, is by the same stroke rejected.”16 In turn, **claims like these have been used to** legitimize the use of violence**; to pit the violence of the state against “**emancipatory violence.”17 Further, it has been used as a pretext for reviving **left-wing** totalitarian traditions, such as Jacobinism, Leninism, and Maoism, and reconsidering their significance for the modern Left.18 Of course, these claims are made cautiously and a modern Maoist like Alain Badiou easily slips into patent misapplication of mathematics to obscure his politics.19

Finally, in opposition to the universal and the concrete, the new radical politics and its advocates in the academy have come to celebrate the **uncertain** **and unstable** as a principle both for conducting politics and for pursuing **research**. Hence, for example, the history of feminist thought has “only paradoxes to offer.”20 **The effort to understand mechanisms of domination** and oppression is itself a manifestation of ideology.21 Any recourse to normative judgments or empirical claims **is hopeless**. “In vain do we try to break out of the ideological dream by ‘opening our eyes and trying to see reality as it is,’ by throwing away the ideological spectacles: as the subjects of such a post-ideological, objective, sober look, free of so-called ideological prejudices, as the subjects of a look which views the facts as they are, we remain throughout ‘the consciousness of our ideological dream.’”22 Ultimately, for the new radical intellectual, everything is a form of ideology. This does not mean that critique should become more rigorous, but, rather, that we should celebrate **indeterminacy**. Au courant theories of emancipation start with the premise that there is no “real.” We become free when we are disabused of the notion that critique can reveal truths that are obfuscated by social relations. We are liberated from definitions and categorizations. Such thinking has had its strongest effect among radical theorists discussing race and gender. Racial and gendered oppression is supposedly combated when we recognize these categories as ideological constructions. However, the consequence of such thinking leaves the systemic and institutionalized forces that perpetuate oppression unaddressed. Both society and individual are constructed by incommensurables. This means that any political struggle that would seek to establish a freer, more just society would fall prey to merely creating new ideologies.

#### That’s what key to solve our offense – pure outside organization will increase repression of harmed populations, but the massive institutional assemblage that is the government provides individuals the possibility to

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What, if anything, can be done? Political and legal opposition is part of the answer. I encourage readers to work for, donate, and support the work of groups that will do just that. Run for office, get involved locally, support those who are threatened and vulnerable. But organizing from the outside is not enough. We need good people on the inside willing to do the hard work of governing responsibly in the face of immense challenges. Indeed, in many areas, such people can serve as a critical bulwark against ill-considered and dangerous policies. Today, the executive branch has around 4,000 political appointees. That may seem like a lot, but there are more than two-and-a-half million executive branch civilian employees. These are the people who do the real, hard, and important day-to-day work of governing. The political appointees, while formally in charge, generally don’t know the agencies as well as the non-political civil servants. And they make millions of small decisions every day that fall beneath the radar or control of political appointees. In his compelling book, National Security and Double Government, Michael Glennon decried the capacity of the bureaucracy to block or slow change in national security. He argued that “the Obama administration’s approach to multiple national security issues has been essentially the same as that of the Bush administration.” He blamed the “Trumanite network”—the managers of the military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement agencies who, he argued, are largely immune from electoral constraints. The same internal resistance that made it difficult for Obama to change many national security policies could prove to be a powerful check on the worst abuses of a Trump Administration. However, that check disappears—or at the very least will be severely diminished—if qualified people with qualms about Trump refuse to serve in the federal government. If the only ones left are those willing to carry out reprehensible policies uncritically, a Trump administration will have greater leeway. It is often said that “people are policy.” That is likely to be all the more true in a Trump Administration, where the views of the president-elect are so ill-formed. Trump himself seems to have very few moral or policy convictions. He has shifted back and forth on nearly every issue. And he did little to prepare for the possibility that he might win. Whereas Hillary had an immense policy staff in waiting and detailed plans for the first 100 days of her presidency, Trump apparently believed that planning ahead was “bad luck.” Those I deeply respect have argued that joining the Trump administration (and remaining within it) will simply serve to “normalize” it. I acknowledge that this is a real cost. But the dangers posed by a government filled only with those who enthusiastically embrace the worst of Trump’s policies are, I believe, worse. Moreover, the danger of normalization (as well as cooptation) can be tempered by the power of public servants to resign—publicly and prominently—when they are asked to formulate or implement abusive policies. Even those at the bottom of the government totem pole have the capacity to help shape the options at the beginning of the conversation, so the illegal orders never come. But if such orders do come, and if internal dissent fails, they can—indeed must—resign. Resignation in response to an illegal or morally repugnant act is more powerful than choosing not to serve or preemptively resigning. In classified national security matters—which are by definition outside public view—such resignations might be the only clue the rest of us have that something terrible is happening. If those who care about rule of law do not serve, there is a good chance we will not know when lines that should not be crossed are crossed—when, for example, black sites have reopened, a program of torture has been reinstated, or families of terrorists are being killed. III. To me, the hardest question is not whether to serve, but whether those who serve will be able to recognize the line between acceptable compromise and what Avishai Margalit has called rotten compromise—a compromise so morally repugnant that we should never accept it, come what may. As Teju Cole powerfully argued last week, our mental alarm bells can sometimes run amok: “Evil settles into everyday life when people are unable or unwilling to recognize it.” Those who serve must beware the slippery slope in which they tell themselves comforting stories about their own capacity to blunt the damage even as they become ever more deeply enmeshed in enabling it. I recognize these dangers. Indeed, in a forthcoming book with my colleague Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists, we write extensively of Carl Schmitt, a legal academic turned lawyer for the Third Reich. Schmitt was not initially a Nazi enthusiast—indeed, many in Hitler’s government distrusted him because he was so late to join the party. And yet he became an extraordinarily important enabler of Hitler’s most horrific policies, blinded by a mix of fear, ambition, and perhaps even a perverse professional ethic. Lawyers, in particular, may be especially vulnerable to such temptations. We are trained to be experts at making a legal argument for our side, whichever it might be. And when a lawyer makes an argument—even one she did not initially believe—she can become enamored of it and gradually lose the capacity to see it critically. Still, I believe it is precisely those who are struggling over whether they can work for a Trump Administration who will be most attentive to these dangers. And those of us on the outside can help by calling out morally and legally repugnant policies once we know of them—and providing arguments, support, and advice to those who serve.

#### There’s independent offense that their mode of politics cannot solve – being open to one another refused to establish control over dangerous forms of new technology that can cause extinction – only via engaging in strong administrative state practices can we challenge anticompetitive big pharma efforts that collapse innovation health systems

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Mariana Mazzucato, “MISSION ECONOMY: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism,” Penguin Publisher, 1/28/21, https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/315/315191/mission-economy/9780241419731.html

A mission-oriented approach in the health sector, where services, therapies and diagnostics are crucial, is a particularly interesting concept because it allows us to look at how missions affect the way in which the public and private sectors produce together. That is, it moves us from policy to actual production. A mission-oriented approach to production means keeping an eye on the objective and governing the value chain to reach that objective. So in producing a vaccine, the mission objective might be that it is universally available and accessible. That will affect how the production and innovation itself is carried out and governed. It will include governance of the intellectual property rights, licensing agreements, and the types of collaborations between large pharmaceutical companies and public labs. Rethinking how to govern health innovation better is particularly relevant because health- innovation systems have long failed to address the world’s greatest needs and put public health first.

Health innovation is expensive, inefficient and unsustainable, while the pharmaceutical sector itself consistently puts profits before people. Largely, this is due to incentives which encourage pharmaceutical companies to set high prices and deliver short-term returns to shareholders instead of investing in riskier, long-term research that advances critical therapies. The high prices of medicines have prevented patients from using them worldwide, or have reduced access to them, with damaging consequences for human health and well-being. This is especially problematic given the very high public spending worldwide on drug innovation. In the USA alone, the National Institutes of Health spends $40 billion a year on it and yet drug prices do not reflect that, leading some to say – an idea we have encountered before – that while the costs are socialized, the profits are privatized.24

#### Popular sovereignty is key to revolutionary change – it reorients institutions towards guaranteeing substantive freedom and equality and responding to diverse forms of political power – don’t give them assertions that we don’t examine root causes of racial violation – they’re multifaceted and ascribing 1 is too generic but the central point is popular sovereignty can fight against opression

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Bruno Leipold, Karma Nabulsi, and Stuart White, “Introduction: Radical Republicanism and Popular Sovereignty,” *Radical Republicanism: Recovering the Tradition’s Popular Heritage*, Eds. Bruno Leipold, Karma Nabulsi, and Stuart White, Oxford University Press 2020, pp. 1-10.

This volume offers a historically informed understanding of republicanism: a political tradition encompassing radical forms of democracy and popular sovereignty. In this tradition, the active and equal political participation of citizens are seen as the core guarantors of liberty, equality, and solidarity. The tradition has an extensive history of revolutionary activity to achieve these principles and of opposition to all forms of domination and oppression that undermine the free and equal standing of citizens in the republic. It lays claim to a long series of struggles against tyrants and despots, slaveholders and colonial masters, patriarchs and oligarchs, and is a tradition that stretches across the world, from Latin America to Haiti, from Asia to Africa. It has combined a commitment to revolution and insurrection with a dedication to building institutions that keep power in the hands of the citizenry, and one that is alert and resilient to oligarchical and imperial encroachments.

Contemporary political theorists are informed by a somewhat distinct conception of republicanism, associated with understandings where ‘the people’ is viewed with suspicion or even something to be guarded against; where courts and expert committees are empowered to counteract possible tyranny by the majority; and where representative government, the rule of law, and the separation of powers are seen as the ultimate guarantors of liberty. Republicanism’s rich and diverse intellectual tradition has, in other words, become largely associated with concepts locating it within contemporary liberalism.

This volume seeks to rectify the current absence of this tradition’s extensive history of radicalism, in the process reintroducing popular sovereignty as a driving force in republican thought. The contributions to the volume set out to retrieve republicanism’s popular and revolutionary heritage, from English Levellers to French and Ottoman revolutionaries, to American abolitionists and trade unionists. It draws on the anti-oligarchical thought of Machiavelli, the radical democratic aspects of Rousseau, and the republican dimensions of Marx’s socialism. Further, the volume explores theoretical accounts of social and structural domination and offers institutional proposals to democratize the state and the economy—from citizens’ assemblies to cooperative production—that are inspired by this radical republican history.

Republicanism’s trajectory is not exclusively radical: moderate and indeed conservative strains can also be traced, especially in its pre-modern incarnations. The sensibilities of Roman statesmen, Florentine ottimati, and American Federalists are an integral part of the republican tradition. Yet the rich language, defining ideas, and organizational forms of republicanism’s radical elements provide us with powerful resources for contemporary discussions about confronting injustice and domination.1

Republican theorists owe a profound debt to the scholarship and body of work developed by Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit, which has articulated a republican conception of freedom as non-domination, where citizens are only free when not subject to the arbitrary, uncontrolled power of a master.2 This conception of liberty has enormous critical potential and has rightly taken its place as one of republicanism’s defining principles. Here, we seek to help extend the concept’s application from political domination (historically the main focus of republicanism) to social and private forms of domination (which are often the most intense form of domination citizens experience),3 as well as emphasizing the structural processes that underlie them.4

Alongside this commitment to non-domination, we argue that the republican tradition is identified with the core principle of popular sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty belonging to the people is one closely tied to republicanism’s other defining commitments: the need for civic virtues in order to create, and then maintain a free republic; the idea that politics should be directed towards the common good of all; and that widespread political deliberation and participation are necessary to achieve a common understanding of that good.5 Like ‘democracy’, popular sovereignty is an ideal which is widely endorsed, but often without any engagement with the radical challenge it presents to more traditional justifications of authority. Instituting the people as the foundational source of the republic’s legitimacy remains republicanism’s most subversive and revolutionary commitment. Our volume consequently seeks to restore the centrality of popular sovereignty to the republican tradition and show how it can inform and serve contemporary republican theorization. In the sections that follow, we indicate some of the contributions that popular sovereignty can make to three central areas of concern for republicanism: its organization in political and social movements, the design of its political institutions, and the structure of its economy. This is followed by an overview of the chapters to follow.

1. Popular Sovereignty and Radical Republican Movements

Under varying political conditions and different times and places, radical and revolutionary movements across the world struggled to achieve liberty and equality for themselves and their people, and identified themselves as republicans. They engaged in this battle with a commonality of facing unequal odds and informed by a shared approach: their reliance—indeed ardent belief—in the justice and the triumphant power of popular sovereignty. Their battle to restore popular sovereignty lay at the heart of radical republican movements’ organizing, and informed the techniques they relied on to change society, the shape their movements took, as well as the institutions they created to advance their goals. For republicans, the source of popular sovereignty lay in a continually refashioned social contract. Indeed, their goal was a return to the natural order of things: for republicans, sovereignty did not reside in the monarch or the hands of a few, but was instead the rightful possession of all. Put simply, popular sovereignty is the foundational principle underlying a just political order. People are the source of power and legitimacy, and therefore all laws and institutions created must be the reflection and outcome of their determining, and their will.

Republicans understood that it was popular sovereignty’s constant location of power and authority in the people themselves, not in the state or its national institutions, that allowed these very institutions to breathe, take life, and have force. When applied, the principle of popular sovereignty ensured that the decisions of any national body were made through its people’s determining, and with their participation and consent. In this way, their general will and its expression are understood as the basis for all legitimate collective political arrangements, structures, laws, strategies, and policies. In the republic they campaigned and fought to create, radical and revolutionary movements viewed popular sovereignty as performing two essential tasks to ensure the republic was sustained: that the people would participate in its institutional workings, and that they recognized the political structures that emerged from their will—where they played the primary role—as representing their desired ends.

Although the principle of popular sovereignty was included (with numerous constraints), in a variety of political institutions of liberal democratic forms, throughout the ‘long nineteenth’ century its formations and expressions were predominantly found within revolutionary, socialist, and anti-colonial liberation movements. Its revolutionary and socialist expressions have a long heritage and tradition across the world; socialist frameworks of popular sovereignty have a rich history in Latin America, Africa, Asia, the Arab world, and Europe.

Through a set of philosophically grounded practices, republicanism remains rooted in a common history with peoples who took up this same mission of instituting popular sovereignty—against a tyrant, a monarch, an empire, or a foreign colonial power. Tracing such common accounts furnish us with a vast reservoir of customs which republicans practised in their political associations, networks, and organizations. In the most inclusive republican imaginary, popular sovereignty can be defined as a legal status, an abstract concept, or a political principle. But it can also be understood as a tradition of action: its vast repertoire of techniques, handed on by successive republicans, provided generations with a concrete education on achieving radical change.

The republicans’ goal to overturn the established order meant that their guiding eighteenth- and nineteenth-century principles of freedom, equality, and fraternity, combined with popular sovereignty, created a model of lengthy, sustained, and often successful revolutionary activity, which represented an ongoing and decisive challenge to the ordering of the international system of states between the second half of the eighteenth century and the end of the twentieth.

Distinctive in many of its features from contemporary Anglo-American republican theory, republican movements had clear doctrines for mobilization that were designed specifically to confront larger, far better-equipped structural forces— notably the powerful apparatus of the imperial state. So revolutionary republicans possessed more than an innovatory language to inspire their cause: in the words of a leader of the republican movement in 1830s France, it was ‘la force revolutionnaire’,6 of mass mobilization: generous, usually national in scope, and offering useful guidelines, rules, and lessons for achieving their dreams.

In its manifest workings, this rich and complex tradition offers patterns of associational practices that provide a system for building a republic: for it was republicans who created republics; not republics (at least in their formation) that created republicans. Sequentially the formation of citizens came before any virtuous republic could appear; republicans’ own capacities became the prerequisite for obtaining a truly free republic, one that would be able to maintain equality and freedom against the constantly increasing power of elites.

Radical republicans believed that the republic belonged to the people, that the wellbeing of a people existed in the extent of their individual and collective freedoms, and in the equality of their relations to each other as citizens. Considered in this light, republicanism as a movement comes into view: associations whose essential purpose was to create and preserve freedom for each and for all, never understood as a limited search for parliamentary democracy alone, or a gradual (and possibly temporary) enfranchising of individual rights and liberties that were prised from the encroachments of an ever expanding state.

Given the strength of their opposition, along with the extensive nature of their goals, radical republicans saw themselves as engaged in a constant battle, a struggle, in a fight. The notion of the military campaign ‘in the field’ was transferred into the arena of the public realm—the battle against empire, tyranny, inequality, and colonialism, now seen as a political campaign, yet most often as the continuation of a military one in a new arena: the public space they were establishing. Equally, the histories of these republican movements illustrate that the battle to transform the body politic from absolute monarchy to free republic was neither spontaneous nor ceded by an existing power. Instead, each liberty was gained by a number of different formations and coalitions of movements over centuries of struggle and enfranchisements.

Combining, developing, augmenting, then conveying the gathered understandings of mid-eighteenth-century republican thought and practice, Rousseau emphasized republicans’ duty to dedicate themselves to advancing the common good for ‘the happiness of all’, in the phrase most commonly used by republicans of the era. In his Social Contract, Rousseau shows the convergence between republican principles—fraternity, equality, liberty—and republican practice. The republic was not simply to be imagined, but was to be fashioned by republicans coming together to work purposefully for it.

In this tradition, although debate, discussion, and deliberation were essential to republicans, and to republicanism, it was not often seen as useful to rely solely upon them in the stage of creating the republic, especially when facing the asymmetry of force of the king’s repressive army and when seeking an immediate end to its gross injustices. Free deliberation could only be secured once the republic protected the rights of all, especially the weak and invisible, to speak and be heard as equals. This classic republican view was captured by the editor of a nineteenth-century republican newspaper: ‘To arrive at the perfection that is possible of society, from the point of departure that we are at, there are two routes: one violent, that of revolutions; the other, peaceful education of public opinion. Both of these are popular, the Tribune accepts them both.’7

With popular sovereignty as a core principle of republicans, their movements that challenged the status quo primarily belonged to the people. Radical republicanism did not typically operate in elite domains (although radical republicans could often be found in the corridors and salons of power and played a key role in them). This subtle, intelligent, and purposive understanding of popular sovereignty created a distinct style of leadership carried by the popular class, based on a shared understanding of leadership as required in all tiers of society, and power, working together as a shared purpose, one body—if playing distinct roles. Republican culture was shared too, across the battleground of the factory, field, town square, association or underground network, and the tyrants’ prisons. Radical republicanism in its various forms, movements, and sectors was led by factory workers, artisans, peasants, prisoners, refugees, and sometimes captains or colonels, and members of the nobility. In the final days of the momentous 1834 silk workers’ insurrection in Lyon, while it was being crushed by the king’s troops, a poster went up in the popular Croix Rousse district calling for the revolution to continue. It expresses this republican adherence to popular rule, of the people’s sovereign right to the public realm, of the intelligence of the sovereignty of the people: ‘no doubt it is terrible that blood must spill in order to fight tyranny . . .but our enemies have already assassinated us before we could dream of taking up arms. We are republicans, and we know all the virtues.’8

2. Popular Sovereignty and Political Institutions

After the republic is founded, popular sovereignty expresses itself not only through citizens’ movements, but also requires a constitutional and institutional context for the making of law and policy. What kind of institutions are needed, or helpful, to give expression to the ideal of popular sovereignty?

One obvious point of inspiration here is once again Rousseau’s Social Contract. Rousseau argues that the legitimacy of a state depends on reconciling freedom and authority, and that this requires a political order in which sovereignty lies with the ‘general will’. As a first approximation at least, we can say that the general will is general in terms of its source and its aims. On the one hand, it is a will that comes from the citizen body as a whole, as expressed in political participation in making the ‘laws’. On the other hand, it is a will that is properly oriented towards the interests of all, towards a common good. Rousseau’s central idea is that when laws have this origin and orientation it is possible for citizens to view the laws as an expression of their will, thereby achieving the ambitious reconciliation between freedom and state authority. For Rousseau, the institution of the general will in this sense is most obviously served by requiring that all fundamental laws be authorized by an assembly of the citizens.

Some further aspects and possible implications of this conception of the polity should be noted. First, note that for Rousseau the sovereign power of the people over their basic laws is in an important sense an active power. In some social contract theories, such as that of John Locke, the people assemble to make their basic laws, but then dissolve, reassembling as a constitutional authority only in a revolutionary context. By contrast, Rousseau’s model of the periodic citizen assembly (CA) captures the idea that popular sovereignty should be institutionalized as an ongoing feature of the political system. When he insists that the CA should meet periodically, independent of the governments’ will, he is asserting that ‘We, the people’ regularly reassemble with authority over the ‘laws’. Second, given the way the general will is oriented to the common good, it is arguable that this conception also entails a central role for public argument, debate, and deliberation so that citizens are able to thrash out the nature of their common good.9 It is also very important, in this connection, that political power is not skewed towards particular social groups (e.g., defined by class or race) who are able to impose their sectional interest at the expense of the common good. As Helena Rosenblatt has argued, Rousseau’s Social Contract was in part motivated by a long-standing concern that power in the Genevan city-state had been effectively usurped by a social elite. His advocacy of the rights of the CA was supposed to be an antidote to this.10

Given this basic vision, what kind of political institutions are implied? To put the question more concretely, how adequate to this vision are the standard institutions of a contemporary representative, parliamentary democracy? Is it enough for a state to have, say, regular, open, and fair elections to legislatures which have the power to make laws and policy?

To begin with, we should perhaps beware of overstating the extent to which radical republicanism necessarily takes issue with these institutions. It is helpful here to recall Bruce Ackerman’s idea of ‘dualist democracy’ in which politics operates at two levels.11 There is, first, a level of ‘normal’ politics in which citizens elect representatives to legislatures to make ordinary law and policy. But normal politics in this sense properly works within the framework of a higher, constitutional law. This implies a second level of ‘constitutional politics’ in which, Ackerman argues, the people properly exercise a sovereign power over the constitution that sets the limits and goals of normal politics. With respect to these two levels of politics, Rousseau makes a related distinction between ‘government’ and ‘sovereign’. The people, in assembly, have sole authority to make the laws while also choosing the institutions and individuals to serve as a government, making detailed policy within the framework of the laws. If we understand ‘laws’ in Rousseau’s discussion to refer to the basic, fundamental laws of the political association, as some interpreters argue we should, then Rousseau’s conception looks very similar to the dualist democracy model identified by Ackerman.12 Within this model, the standard institutions of representative democracy have an important place. They are central to the operation of normal politics.

Nevertheless, a radical republican may have reason to doubt the adequacy of these institutions by themselves. First, while these institutions might have a central place in normal politics, what about constitutional politics? This is the point (or, at least, a point) at which Rousseau’s picture of an active popular sovereign comes in. How can the people retain their authority over the basic, fundamental laws of their polity? Are the standard institutions of parliamentary democracy adequate to this, or is there a need for further institutions? Possibilities here include requirements for periodic constitutional conventions to review the basic laws and/or powers for citizens to initiate conventions or direct votes on constitutional amendments.

Second, the historic record, and contemporary politics in many nations, suggests that the standard institutions of representative democracy are by no means invulnerable to capture by socio-economic elites. For example, where electoral competition requires resources, and the rich are in a better position to offer politicians resources, there is always a danger that the politicians will become overly attentive to the preferences of the rich at the expense of the common good. Radical republicanism will therefore want to see strict controls on the role of ‘money in politics’. This concern is also a further consideration in support of giving citizens the power to initiate reviews and even direct popular votes independently of the elected legislature.

That said, ‘direct democracy’ undoubtedly carries its own risks from a radical republican point of view. Even if the process of direct democracy, e.g., in the form of citizens’ initiatives, can be insulated from the power of money in politics, it is possible for these processes to be used in objectionably ‘majoritarian’ ways, e.g., to oppress racial or sexual minorities.13 The radical republican response in part refers us back to the importance of social movements and the wider associational context in which institutions operate. These movements and related associations, such as trade unions, can potentially both push back against the power of money in politics and raise the voices of popular and minority groups. A further, complementary response, however, is to think further about the institutions themselves. For example, is there a role here for ‘micro-publics’, such as CAs?14

CAs are bodies of representatives chosen on a near random basis, but so as to be descriptively representative of the population along dimensions such as gender, race, and region. CAs are typically given an issue or proposal to consider, and their discussion of the issue or proposal is structured through learning, testimony, and decision phases, supported by facilitators who aim at full participation by all involved. Evidence from a number of nations suggests that they can achieve highquality deliberation.15 Placing CAs within citizen initiative processes might be one way to raise their deliberative quality and orientation to the common good.

More generally, CAs direct our attention to the possible value of sortition in a radical republican perspective: of choosing representatives by lot, a practice used in many ancient, medieval, and early modern city-states.16 John P. McCormick has recently outlined an interesting variant of the CA which he calls the tribunate.17 Drawing on Machiavelli’s works, McCormick argues for an understanding of ‘the people’ as distinct from and standing in conflict with society’s economic and political elite (a perspective he argues is occluded by the more Rousseauian picture of the people as a unitary popular sovereign). Conventional institutions of representative democracy in capitalist societies do not offer any formal or explicit representation of the people in this Machiavellian sense and, McCormick argues, this enhances the potential for effective elite control even within the framework of formally democratic institutions. As a counter, McCormick proposes (in the United States context) the setting up of a body of fifty-one citizens to be chosen at random for non-renewable one-year terms. The tribunate’s members will be chosen by lot from the general population but excluding the wealthiest 10 per cent and politicians and with provision to enhance representation members of historically oppressed groups such as African American and Native American citizens. The tribunate would have powers to veto proposals coming from other branches of government, to initiate referendums, and to initiate impeachment proceedings against political officials.

Insofar as radical republicanism continues to make use of election in representation, there is also an interest in mechanisms that increase the accountability of elected officials to voters (thereby limiting the risks that they give undue preference to the preferences and interests of elites). Possibilities here include placing representatives under imperative mandates as to how they can vote. Another possibility is to give voters effective powers to recall elected representatives if they are dissatisfied with their performance. For both elected and non-elected representatives, having short terms of office might also enhance accountability, as might limits on the number of terms for which someone can sit as a representative.

Radical republicanism does not offer a single set of institutional prescriptions for democratic political life. But its emphasis on popular sovereignty, and on the properly active and deliberative and contestatory quality of popular sovereignty, points to a need to think creatively about political institutions in a way that goes beyond the conventional structures of representative democracy, taking in (and perhaps integrating) proposals for things like citizens’ initiatives, micro-publics, sortition, and rights of recall. These proposals for political institutions need to be understood, however, as working in tandem with the radical republican emphasis on the value of citizens’ movements and with a radical republican agenda for the economy. There is no purely, narrowly ‘institutional’ solution to the challenge of realizing genuine popular sovereignty.

#### Tons of empirics prove our read on state practices is accurate

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Jeremy, *Common Ground: Democracy and Collectivity in an Age of Individualism* p. 200-206.

Having said this, it would be problematic simply to dismiss projects such as Burning Man or even the Boom festival for their failure to exhibit these qualities: to some extent their lack of self-doubt and political ambition are conditions of possibility for their success as sites of relatively safe affective and symbolic experimentation. If they lack effective connections with wider political movements then the fault lies as much with those movements, or with all of us who might have built new ones but haven't yet. Although it is right to try to catalyse processes of democratic self-questioning and the interrogation of internal hierarchies in all social situations, it remains the case that in the face of neoliberalism's attempt to privatise every aspect of existence, it becomes politically crucial to defend every such possible site of' collective joy' (Ehrenreich 2007).

It is also important to note, of course, that raves and festivals are very far indeed from exhausting the possible forms of such sites. I have referred to them consistently here because they constitute an easy illustration of what such a site can look like, and they have been through interesting processes of radicalisation and reterritorialisation over recent decades. There are many other such sites which are arguably much more important, however. Given its importance to the cultural life of millions, for example, the commercialisation and celebritisation of sport in recent years is arguably a far greater cause for concern. 16 And instances in which physical crowds gather are not of course the only significant potential sites of shared joyous affect. Social networking protocols are just the latest manifestation of the inherent capacity of advanced communications technologies to manifest this potential, at an extraordinary level of distribution and complexity, enabling all kinds of empowering connections to occur between disparate elements of human experience; and it is clearly a potential which companies such as Facebook wish to contain, delimit, and exploit carefully: ensuring, for example, that users maintain a single .individual profile, identifying themselves as easily trackableconsumers, and do not engage in any kind of activity which cannot be profitably data-mined.

But I want to take this complexification of the idea of a 'site of collective joy' even further. I would suggest, in fact, that this kind of joy need not have anything to do with the physical proximity of bodies or the noise of the electronic crowd. Even an activity as superficially solitary as reading in a library can be understood as an experience of such a site, to the extent that it involves a creative and productive interaction between singularities: those elements of the reader's conscious and unconscious attention which are engaged in reading; the multiple ideas and possible uses thereof which are partially expressed in the books they read; the elements of the physical, architectural, economic, social, cultural and political assemblage which make the very existence of a library possible; and so on. A library can only exist - can only be individuated - as the consequence of a complex process of social interactions, and can only function well to the extent to which it works as a commons to increase the capacities of its users, while remaining sufficiently flexible and open in form and function to accommodate the invention of multiple and changing uses. Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, a library is not simply a public space or a private space, but must be at the same time both and neither, enabling a diverse population to share resources while also enabling each person, if necessary, to do so relatively undisturbed. This, just as much as the raving crowd (Gilbert 1997), incarnates the ideal of the multitude as a collectivity which empowers but does not suppress the singularity of its constituent elements; and it is possible to experience the democratic sublime in a moment of exemplary clarity or exhilarating confusion (or to experience the disempowerment of bored frustration} at least as much in the one place as the other. What such spaces have in common is that they are all, in a certain sense, spaces of decision, within and from which new individuations and new becomings can emerge. This is not to say they are necessarily spaces within which actual conscious choices are made (although they might be). In fact they are spaces within which we can only experience the ultimate impossibility of making a 'decision' or 'choice' according to the classical liberal model of the rational, intentional, autonomous and autochthonous subject: a decision which is final, which is ours alone, and which is an expression of only our rational interests. But it is by virtue of this fact that they are spaces conducive to the expansion of a field of potentiality and possibility, without which no new decisions, no new individuations, no collective joy, and hence no democracy are ever possible.

Problems of Strategy and Government

The arguments presented in this chapter so far invite some obvious reactions: How far is it possible to construct systems and institutions which facilitate the emergence of the kind of hetero-affective collective decisions described earlier in the chapter, not just at the level of political organisation, but also at the level of government? At the same time, at the level of political organisation itself: what happens when waiting for such events of collective individuation to emerge simply will not do, when circumstances demand that determinate, conscious choices have to be made here and now?

One answer to this question is to observe that social change is of course not ultimately possible without determined efforts by broad-based aggregations of political forces co-ordinated by a viable political strategy: without, in other words, hegemonic projects. The democratic potential of the Latin American multitude would not have reached any kind of realisation without the strategic co-ordination enabled by the political parties led by Chavez, Morales and Lula. The women's movement only secured significant results by successfully transforming the common sense of a majority of the public in many countries in the world and implementing consequent legislative change. The inability of, for example, the rave and festival movements in the United Kingdom to defend themselves from criminalisation and commercialisation is testament to how far being 'an affective process without a subject' gets you in the long term, if your enemies are stronger and better organised than you are (McKay 1996, Gilbert and Pearson 1999). One of the characteristics that all of the most successful political and cultural projects for democratisation share including but not limited to those already discussed in this chapter- is what I have called a 'strategic orientation' (Gilbert 2008b). By this I mean not a determinate strategy, but merely an awareness of the complexity and specificity of their strategic situation: their strengths, limitations, threats, opportunities and opponents in the broader field of political forces.

However, if this sounds like a rather minimal concept, then so it should, because it is important not to have unreasonable expectations of those types of political and cultural intervention which necessarily operate on a 'molecular' scale. No single project, organisation, tendency or process can be expected to deliver radical social change; such change can only ever come about as the result of a complex distribution and aggregation of forces.

The gains (and failures) of the women's movement, for example, have always been a product of relationships between interventions in the domains of affective relations, symbolic culture (for example, involving questions of the representation of women in print and broadcast media), political organisation (for example, involving questions of women's representation within political and governmental institutions), and institutional management (Fraser 2013). To put it crudely: the upshot of this observation is that the necessary task of hard political strategising should not be understood as falling on every group who wants to make social change happen: under conditions of advanced neoliberal post-democracy, it may well have to fall to established and well-resourced mainstream political organisations: the unions and the social-democratic parties, in particular, or those intermediary organisations which seek to mediate between them and a range of other social actorsY Conversely, professional political organisers and leaders may have to accept that they cannot bring about the cultural change which would make their political projects viable, and instead be on the lookout for sympathetic and potentially important tendencies as they emerge within wider culture.

The complex interdependence between the 'molar' and 'molecular' dimensions of politics is not, of course, a new phenomenon and does not work in only one direction. For example, the efflorescence of radical democratic demands in the 1960s was itself partly a product of the successes of the social-democratic governmental projects from the 1930s onwards, which freed large populations from the immediate fear of poverty for the first time since the industrial revolution, so enabling a profounder imaginative challenge amongst many of them to existing social relations than would otherwise have been possible;18 this social-democratic success was itself made possible in part by the 'molecular' cultural changes of the inter-war period: in particular the diffusion of' modernism', in both its avant-garde and popular variants (Williams 1989). It is therefore obviously a mistake to imagine that either the strategic, molar and hegemonic or the molecular, affective and experimental dimensions of political struggle can ever be ignored. Nor can any one of them be expected to bear the full weight of hopes and demands for social change. In most contemporary contexts, it is to be expected that the multiple tasks required to make change possible are likely to be borne by quite different kinds of agent: from art movements to think tanks to university departments to civil society organisations to political parties. Such tasks include generating new modes of thought and perception which might contribute to cultural change; crystallising those affective changes into meaningful political demands; strategically co-ordinating a range of demands and constituencies into a viable political coalition; delivering a coherent programme for government which instantiates some of those changes; recruiting and mobilising a cadre of professional politicians who can implement this programme; sustaining the affective and semiotic potency of those demands to the point that such realisation becomes likely; and many others. Because such tasks require quite different dispositions and competences, it is not surprising that their agents often dislike each other and find mutual comprehension difficult; but it is probably necessary for any kind of democratic progress that there should exist a degree of what we might call 'molecular sympathy' between them. Arguably one of the most debilitating features of the political Left - mainstream and radical - in recent decades has been its inability to connect or even resonate at all with sites of radical cultural experimentation. 19

This raises once again the issue of what kinds of political organisation and institutional innovation might make radical democratic hopes concretely realisable. This is an issue addressed by Erik Olin Wright and Archon Fung in their co-edited book Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innm,ations in Empowered Participat01y Gwernance (Wright and Fung 2003). This work is largely a collection of studies of localised experiments in participatory and deliberative democracy, such as the famous Porto Alegre participatory budgeting process, or the decentralised planning process deployed by the leftist government of Kerala.20 In itself the collection stands as evidence for the viabilityof participatory democratic forms in wildly varying contexts; but what is particularly interesting for us here is the conclusion reached by the editors in their epilogue.

Wright and Fung argue that such experiments in participatory democracy, at least under present socio-political conditions, are always in danger of degeneration into democratic inefficacy, or co-option, or neutralisation by more powerful political and commercial forces. They argue that these outcomes are only avoidable where there exists sufficient 'countervailing powe**r'** - in other words, sufficiently well-organised and mobilised political constituencies- to defend their democratic status. Going further, they suggest that this countervailing power must be deployed by forces which are strong and well-organised, but whose relationship to government is not habitually adversarial, but instead collaborative: engaging in complex tactical problem-solving, and constructive institutional engagement, but from a position of strategic strength. Wright and Fung underscore, with a justified degree of pessimism, the difficulty of mobilising on such terms movements and organisations whose identities and practices are grounded in adversarial relationships to existing power structures. A number of the conceptual distinctions we have encountered in this study are relevant to understanding this argument. In Laclau's terms, Wright and Fung can be read as suggesting that such radical democratic innovation requires an 'institutionalist' (or perhaps we might coin the term 'counter-institutionalist'21 ) practice on the part of movements formed on a populist basis. Following Deleuze and Guattari, we could say that the difficulty they highlight is that of enacting a molecular deterritorialisation of existing institutions from the position of a molar collectivity. And yet the great value of the schizoanalytic perspective is that it demonstrates the extent to which every such molarity is already an assemblage, constituted by its lines of flight and its molecular processes, and so would suggest that such a transition need not be understood simply as the reversal of a group's constituted nature, but as an activation and intensification of its most dynamic constituent tendencies. This last phrase of mine deliberately echoes a key distinction made by Antonio Negri between 'constituent power' (the creative power of the multitude of which all true democracy is an expression) and 'constituted power' (actually existing institutions of government) (Negri 1999). In fact what seems to be at stake here is a generalised extension of Gramsci's concept of political struggle as a 'war of position', a sort of ongoing trench or siege warfare which is distinguished from the full-frontal revolutionary assault of the classic 'war of manoeuvre' or 'war of movement'.

The same thing happens in the art of politics as happens in military art: war of movement increasingly becomes war of position, and it can be said that a State will win a war in so far as it prepares for it minutely and technically in peacetime. The massive structures of the modem democracies, both as State organisations, and as complexes of associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics as it were the 'trenches' and the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position. (Gramsci 1971: 243)

Wright and Fung's formulation develops an element which is already implicit in Gramsci's: even while it is strategising against its opponents and inventing institutions of its own, a radical force must have a constructive, creative dimension. The implication of the foregoing argument is that this creative dimension cannot be expressed only through the positive, ex nihilo construction of new institutions; it also requires processes of molecular, transformative engagement with existing systems.

## 1NR

### Case

#### That will transition the state to fascism which is much worse than the status quo

**Condit 15** [Celeste, Distinguished Research Professor of Communication Studies at the University of Georgia, “Multi-Layered Trajectories for Academic Contributions to Social Change,” Feb 4, 2015, *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Volume 101, Issue 1, 2015]

Thus, when Žižek and others urge us to “Act” with violence to destroy the current Reality, without a vision of an alternative, on the grounds that the links between actions and consequences are never certain, we can call his appeal both a failure of imagination and a failure of reality. As for reality, we have dozens of revolutions as models, and the historical record indicates quite clearly that they generally lead not to harmonious cooperation (what I call “AnarchoNiceness” to gently mock the romanticism of Hardt and Negri) but instead to the production of totalitarian states and/or violent factional strife. A materialist constructivist epistemology accounts for this by predicting that it is not possible for symbol-using animals to exist in a symbolic void. All symbolic movement has a trajectory, and if you have not imagined a potentially realizable alternative for that trajectory to take, then what people will leap into is biological predispositions—the first iteration of which is the rule of the strongest primate. Indeed, this is what experience with revolutions has shown to be the most probable outcome of a revolution that is merely against an Evil. The failure of imagination in such rhetorics thereby reveals itself to be critical, so it is worth pondering sources of that failure. The rhetoric of “the kill” in social theory in the past half century has repeatedly reduced to the leap into a void because the symbolized alternative that the context of the twentieth century otherwise predispositionally offers is to the binary opposite of capitalism, i.e., communism. That rhetorical option, however, has been foreclosed by the historical discrediting of the readily imagined forms of communism (e.g., Žižek9). The hard work to invent better alternatives is not as dramatically enticing as the story of the kill: such labor is piecemeal, intellectually difficult, requires multi-disciplinary understandings, and perhaps requires more creativity than the typical academic theorist can muster. In the absence of a viable alternative, the appeals to Radical Revolution seem to have been sustained by the emotional zing of the kill, in many cases amped up by the appeal of autonomy and manliness (Žižek uses the former term and deploys the ethos of the latter). But if one does not provide a viable vision that offers a reasonable chance of leaving most people better off than they are now, then Fox News has a better offering (you'll be free and you'll get rich!). A revolution posited as a void cannot succeed as a horizon of history, other than as constant local scale violent actions, perhaps connected by shifting networks we call “terrorists.” This analysis of the geo-political situation, of the onto-epistemological character of language, and of the limitations of the dominant horizon of social change indicates that the focal project for progressive Left Academics should now include the hard labor to produce alternative visions that appear materially feasible.

#### Autonomous experimentation is aspirational and ignoring the state causes worse fill-in

King, 16—has been active in campaigning for refugee rights and against border controls for over a decade, has taught at the University of Nottingham and worked as a caseworker with the British Refugee Council (Natasha, *No Borders: The Politics of Immigration Control and Resistance* pg 39-42, dml)

But to what extent are these experiments in autonomy ever entirely autonomous? In response to Richard Day’s book on the newest social movements, Richard Thompson argues that it’s unrealistic to talk about creating wholly autonomous social structures because ‘[t]he second they’re consequential is the second they’ll be noticed [by the state]. At that point, it becomes impossible to break the cycle of antagonism by will alone. They will come after us’ (Thompson n.d., emphasis added). In other words, experiments in autonomy are rarely (if ever) entirely free from a relation to the state, or from state antagonism, and we are rarely able to ignore that antagonism. We mayantagonize the state, but we are forced also to respond to the state, as a form of self-defence. This has happened time and time again, from the steady illegalization of squatting in Europe, and the tightening of laws around private property, to the infiltration by the CIA of the Black Panther movement, to the struggle between the Zapatistas and the Mexican state. We see this in the struggle for the freedom of movement when, continuing with the examples above, the EU employs Frontex special missions on the Turkish/Greek borders, or when the living spaces of people without papers are raided or destroyed.¶ Whether people have been forced to, or they have seen it as the best strategy, the history of struggles for liberation has been one that included demands on the state. Often this has taken the form of engagement in a politics of rights and/or recognition. From the movement of the Sans Papiers in France, to ‘a Day without Migrants’ in the USA; from campaigns that fight against the detention and deportation of people without papers, to struggles against police violence, resistance through forms of visible collective action have been central to struggles against the border. In most cases such struggles have made demands on the state, particularly through seeking recognition as a group, and through making claims to rights. But to what extent are demands for rights and/or recognition part of a no borders politics? ¶ Demands for rights and recognition have played a big part in the struggle for the freedom of movement. Yet there has been a long history of criticism over the politics of citizenship. Rights claims, for example, have been seen as essentially reinforcing the role of the state as the benefactor and grantor of rights, and reinforcing the notion that rights represent entitlements applicable to those who fit certain descriptions of being a human (cf. Arendt 1973 [1951]; Barbagallo and Beuret 2008; Bojadžijev and Karakayali 2010; Elam 1994). From this perspective, demands for rights and representation amount to disputes over the allocation of equality and therefore can only ever achieve a redistribution of that equality, rather than undermining the idea that equality is somehow qualified in the first place. As Imogen Tyler says, ‘[c]itizenship is a famously exclusionary concept, and its exclusionary force is there by design. The exclusions of citizenship are immanent to its logic, and not at all accidental. Citizenship is meant to produce successful and unsuccessful subjects. Citizenship, in other words, is “designed to fail”’ (Tyler, quoted in Nyers 2015: 31). ¶ Similar variations of this critique have appeared in the autonomy of migration debate. Representation can also be thought of as a bordering technology that seeks to pacify and discipline expressions of autonomy (or attempts at escape) (Papadopoulos et al. 2008). In other words, the politics of citizenship is problematic because it only ever brings people into the state. ‘Of course migrants become stronger when they become visible by obtaining rights, but the demands of migrants and the dynamics of migration cannot be exhausted in the quest for visibility and rights’ (ibid.: 219).¶ I have a lot of sympathy with these arguments, and because of them am extremely suspicious of a politics of citizenship. But when it comes to actual practices of struggle against the border, a resolute stand against such strategies seems naïve, and insulting to those who have taken part. Migrant-led struggles have often been claims for rights, and ultimately I don’t want to dismiss such practices because they are philosophically problematic. In fact, sometimes to appeal to rights or recognition is the only available strategy in situations of extreme vulnerability, where people’s options are highly limited. Recognizing that we are in relations of power right now means also recognizing that our situation is imperfect and that we have to struggle in our (imperfect) reality. Youssef, a long-time activist for the freedom of movement in Greece, himself of North African descent, talked about the need for pragmatism in tactics; that sometimes we must engage with the state in order to bring about greater freedoms now. ‘Today, in Creta, in Chania, they will catch five people. How can I take them from the jail? I have something in the police station, OK. I have to talk with them today. OK? But tomorrow I can fuck him. He’s not my friend. He’s not my comrade. OK. We are talking today. Tomorrow we are fucking’ (interview, Youssef). His statement reflects how many practices that refuse the border often come out of necessity. In other words they’re rarely part of some intentional or ‘noble’ act to become a rights-bearer, say, and more often pragmatic decisions based on the need to alleviate immediate situations of oppression. ¶ A no borders politics seeks to go beyond claims to representation and rights that ultimately stand to reinforce the state. But claims to representation and rights can sometimes do this too. Building on Foucault’s idea that power can be both positive and empowering or negative and dominating, Biddy Martin and Chandra Mohanty suggest that fighting oppression involves seeing power in a way that refuses totalizing visions of it and can therefore account for the possibility of resistance, as in creating something new, within existing power relations (Martin and Mohanty 2003: 104). Suggesting that representation only ever brings people into power therefore means rejecting a vast range of moments when the oppressed have voiced their refusal to be reduced to non-beings outside of politics (Sharma 2009: 475). In other words, resistance is not only or always a reaction to the constraining effects of dominating power, but can also express power as something positive and liberating. From the Black Panthers to the Sans Papiers, demands for representation, when carried out by minority groups for themselves, can challenge the role of dominant power over that group and create new, emancipated subjectivities (Goldberg 1996; Malik 1996). Depending on who it is that acts, then, in some cases demands for recognition/rights can be a radical and transformative political act (Nyers 2015. See also Butler and Spivak 2007; Isin 2008; Nyers and Rygiel 2012). As Nandita Sharma suggests, in response to Papadopoulos et al.’s book Escape Routes, ¶ we must recognise that making life and fashioning our subjectivities are intimately intertwined and making ‘new social bodies’ … is not the same as bringing people back into power through identity politics (or identity policing). It is important to recognise that there are significant qualitative differences between subjectivities. There are those that Papadopoulos et al. rightly discuss as bringing us directly back into power – and which account for most of the subjectivities that people hold today (‘race’, ‘nation’, ‘heterosexual’, ‘homosexual’, ‘native’ and so on) – but there are also those that are born of practices of escape. (Sharma 2009: 473, emphasis in original).

### T

#### The U.S. government is 3 branches

Black’s Law Dictionary 90 (6th Edition, p. 695)

In the United States, government consists of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in addition to administrative agencies. In a broader sense, includes the federal government and all its agencies and bureaus, state and county governments, and city and township governments.

#### The United States federal government constitutes of the executive, legislative, and judicial branch

Wordnet Princeton 7http://poets.notredame.ac.jp/cgi-bin/wn?cmd=wn&word=federal\_government

federal government -- (a government with strong central powers) United States government, United States, U.S. government, US Government, U.S. -- (the executive and legislative and judicial branches of the federal government of the United States) HAS INSTANCE=> Capital, Washington -- (the federal government of the United States)

#### Should means ought to

Kernerman 13 Kernerman English Multilingual Dictionary © 2006-2013 K Dictionaries Ltd.

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/should

should (ʃud) – negative short form shouldn't (ˈʃudnt) – verb

2. used to state that something ought to happen, be done etc. You should hold your knife in your right hand; You shouldn't have said that.